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SUMMARY
As anyone paying attention during the 2008–2009 financial crisis is aware, the Canadian financial system
weathered the storm uniquely well. Exactly why Canada’s system remained so comparatively stable, while so
many other foreign systems broke down, is a question that remains largely unsettled. One explanation may be
that the regulatory system that emerged from a very specific history of prior crises had both prepared Canada
well for such a crisis, and responded effectively as the crisis unfolded. But the very regulatory system that
provided stability in recent years may also be at risk of becoming warped by its own success, with regulators
so emboldened by the acclaim for their recent achievements that they overreach to ensure their track record
remains unblemished in the future.
The stunning collapse of a pair of western Canadian banks, a number of major Canadian trust companies and
several insurance companies, as well as some other precarious near misses in the 1980s and 1990s, were a shock
to the financial regulatory system, highlighting deficiencies that would be addressed with new regulations and,
most notably, the creation of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). Canada’s
centralized regulatory approach, through the OSFI and just four other major regulatory bodies, has proved both
more elegant and effective than, for instance, the more complicated, more convoluted and more decentralized
American financial-oversight system. But some regulated companies, insurers in particular, have long
maintained that the concentration of power in Canada’s large banks has resulted in a one-size-fits-all regulatory
approach that does not offer a relatively lighter burden for smaller institutions, potentially stifling growth. In
other words, an over-emphasis on stability may be hampering market efficiency. Nor is there any economic
evidence to shed light on whether those and other costs of regulating stability are justified by the costs spared
by avoiding instability. Received wisdom would naturally assume that avoiding certain institutional collapses are
worth any cost, but of course there must be some limits to that logic.
To be clear, Canada’s regulatory model almost certainly appears to be a better-functioning one than that of
many in its peer group, and the OSFI approach is gaining acceptance by many countries, particularly in
emerging markets that are implementing cohesive regulatory systems for the first time, using the Canadian
framework as a template. This does not, however, mean that Canada’s regulatory system cannot still be refined
and improved. Suggestions for improvement include: the possibility of creating an industry-based collaboration
committee — similar to the regulators’ Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee — that would monitor
industry risk over time; the modernization of the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, conceived more than a
century ago, to address the modern reality of immense and complex institutions of today, providing regulators
the flexibility to resolve such entities when they become troubled; and the strengthening of board structures for
large institutions, which remain much as they were in the 1980s, including the possibility of appointing
permanent, full-time, independent directors and requirements for boards to better train directors and utilize
outside expertise when warranted. Canada’s regulatory system is arguably one of the most effective in
existence, but its success through the recent financial crisis is no guarantee that it will be sufficiently prepared
for the next.
† The helpful contribution of Leon Bloom, Partner, Deloitte Toronto, is gratefully acknowledged. Norma
Nielson, Director of the University of Calgary’s Financial Markets Regulatory Program, also provided useful
input. Of course, any inaccuracies are the sole responsibility of the author.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of this paper is to describe the evolution of the Canadian government’s
regulation of the financial services industry, with particular regard to the businesses of banking
and insurance. A secondary objective is to consider whether there are aspects of the Canadian
financial regulatory framework that explain, or partially explain, why Canada is now generally
perceived to be a “high achiever” in this field. By most measures, the Canadian economy and
Canada’s financial institutions have had a more stable and predictable performance than most
other jurisdictions since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. If there are particular features
of the Canadian financial regulatory system that have contributed to stable and predictable
performance, it will obviously be beneficial to discern what they are, if only to enable other
interested parties to consider how such features might be successfully incorporated into the
financial regulatory frameworks of their own jurisdictions. It is also hoped that this paper will
provide a useful backdrop for additional papers and research that will be prepared under the
sponsorship of the Financial Markets Regulation Program at the University of Calgary’s School
of Public Policy. 
At the outset, we need to be clear on the objective of financial services industry regulation. In
our view, it is to ensure system stability and to protect depositors and policyholders within a
global financial marketplace. Members of the public — who provide the bulk of the required
funding for banks and insurers through their deposits and premiums, respectively — must be
able to have a high degree of confidence in the obligations and promises undertaken by their
financial institutions. Lacking this confidence, the financial system would quickly fall into
disorder, with dramatic impact on the economy as a whole. At the same time, a balance must be
maintained between the need to maintain citizens’ confidence in the system, and the need to
provide shareholders with an opportunity to earn a satisfactory risk-adjusted return on capital. If
this latter circumstance does not also prevail, shareholders will not invest, which again would
result in the inability of the financial system to function. In endeavouring to maintain the
appropriate balance between these competing objectives, the cost of regulation (including not
just the monetary cost but also the potential cost in terms of burdening the efficiency and
effectiveness of financial markets) must also be part of the equation. The over-arching purpose
of the financial regulatory system is to achieve a satisfactory balance between these competing
objectives. 
The need for well-designed systems of financial regulation has never been greater given the
devastating impact of the recent financial crisis and the increasingly global nature of the
financial services industries.
SURVEY OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Since Confederation in 1867, the Canadian financial system has been the subject of six major
reviews: the MacTavish Royal Commission on Life Insurance in 1906; the McKeown Royal
Commission to Inquire into and Report upon the Affairs of the Home Bank of Canada in 1924;
the MacMillan Royal Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada in 1933; the Porter
Royal Commission on Banking and Finance in 1964; the Estey Inquiry into the Collapse of the
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CCB and Northland Bank in 1986; and the McKay Task Force — dubbed “Reforming
Canada’s Financial Services Sector” — in 1996. In addition to these in-depth government
reviews, in 1985, the Department of Finance — responding to a series of financial-institution
failures — released a major green paper, The Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions:
Proposals for Discussion. Also in 1985, there was the Final Report of the Working Committee
on the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, known as “The Wyman Report.” Each of these
latter two papers commented extensively on perceived inadequacies in the regulatory system
and put forward recommendations for action. 
Some of these inquiries and papers have had financial regulation as a major focus of their
investigations; others have not. But at the very least, each has provided an invaluable overview
of the financial system, viewed from the perspective of the times in which they were written.
These extensive reviews and papers, all commissioned by the government of Canada, have
provided much of the historical input for this paper, supported by various scholarly papers and
other sources as referenced. 
The Early Days of Canadian Banking
The origins for banking in Canada were in the United States, where a bank charter was granted
by Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the Treasury, to the First Bank of the United
States in 1791. The Canadian banking system is a direct descendant of the First Bank, which
itself was in part modelled after the Bank of England.1
The first modern bank incorporated in Canada, by an act of the then-province of Lower
Canada, was the Bank of Montreal, which opened for business in 1817. A number of banks had
been incorporated prior to 1817, but each of these disappeared through merger or failure.2 The
Bank of Montreal Act of Incorporation served as a model for the incorporation of other banks
in later years.
The Canada Life Assurance Company was Canada’s first incorporated life insurer, established
in 1849 by an act of the province of Upper Canada.3 As was the case with the Bank of
Montreal, the company’s special act contained investment powers and other features that were
later used as the model for special act incorporations of other life insurers. 
The First Bank Act and Revisions
In 1871, the first Bank Act was adopted by the newly formed Canadian Parliament, authorizing
Canadian banks to “open branches and agencies or offices of discount and deposit and transact
business at any place or places in the Dominion.”4 This was the genesis of the branch banking
1 Report from the Commission of Inquiry into the Collapse of the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) and the
Northland Bank (Estey Inquiry), 1986, Appendix A, 349.
2 Bank of Montreal website, http://www.bmo.com/home/about/banking/corporate-information/history.
3 12 Vic, chap 168.
4 Estey Inquiry Report, Appendix A, 351.
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3system that has been a hallmark of Canadian banking practice. (See page 11 for a discussion of
the growth of a national, branch banking system in Canada, versus the system in the United
States, where small regional banks tended to be the norm.) A particularly far-sighted provision
of the original Bank Act was that it was to expire in 1881, laying the foundation for the system
of mandatory decennial revision.5 Mandatory revision of financial services industry statutes
(today, every five years) is undoubtedly a worthwhile regulatory practice — one that few
jurisdictions have adopted, and which, in our view, has been to their disadvantage. 
The new act limited bank dividend payments to eight per cent per annum until such time as a
surplus account had been built up to a level of 20 per cent of paid capital.6 The act required
initial capital of $500,000, of which $100,000 had to be paid in before commencing business,
with a further $100,000 within two years. The remainder could be called on as required by the
bank. (The estimated current value of $100,000 in 1871 is about $7.6 million.)7
An interesting feature of the 1871 Bank Act, modeled on then existing banking laws in the
United States,8 was the so-called “double liability” requirement. The terminology refers to the
fact that, in the event of insolvency, bank shareholders stood to lose not only their investment,
but additionally, they would be assessed for an amount up to the par value of the shares they
owned. At that time, bank shares were almost always $100 par value, with treasury shares
offered at par. Thus, in the event of liquidation, every shareholder would be assessed for an
additional contribution up to the par value of shares owned. Some U.S. state legislatures actually
provided that state bank shareholders would be assessed for multiples of the par value of their
shares (Colorado, for example, adopted triple liability) and in California, the principle of limited
liability for corporate shareholders was entirely suspended, with bank shareholders being subject
to unlimited liability to depositors. Although such provisions would have had a substantial
negative impact on the ability of banks to raise capital, Benjamin Beckhart, in his seminal 1929
publication, The Banking System of Canada, states that the double-liability feature “has been
of real protection to the depositors.”9 Nevertheless, in the U.S. and Canada over the course
of the Depression years, all variations of the double-liability provision were abandoned as
policymakers became convinced that the benefits for depositors were not sufficient to offset the
economic repercussions of making it so difficult for banks to raise capital.10
5 Benjamin Beckhart, The Banking System of Canada (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), 301.
6 Ibid.
7 Estimated, based on the Bank of Canada’s inflation calculator, which covers the 99 years between 1914 and today,
and assuming that the 3.1 per cent average rate of inflation over that period can be extended back an additional 43
years to 1871.
8 Double liability was adopted by the U.S. Congress as part of the National Bank Act of 1863.
9 Beckhart, The Banking System, 482.
10 For more information on the subject of double liability, see: Benjamin C. Esty, “The Impact of Contingent Liability
on Commercial Bank Risk Taking,” Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Journal of
Financial Economics 47 (1998). Using U.S. data from 1900 to 1915, Esty demonstrates that “banks subject to stricter
liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility, hold a lower proportion of risky assets, and are less likely to
increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines, consistent with the hypothesis that stricter
liability discourages commercial bank risk taking.”
Commenting on that first Bank Act in 1871, Beckhart indicates: “Through the adoption of this
legislation, Canada had perhaps the most elaborate and detailed banking code of the British
Empire.”11 But notwithstanding that accolade, we find that in the 22 years after Confederation
— i.e., between 1867 and 1889 — 10 banks failed and nine others ceased transacting business,
involving heavy losses to depositors and shareholders.12 Canada endured a period of recession
during the 1880s, making life particularly difficult for the country’s evolving banking industry.
According to Beckhart, “the banking failures occurring in the eighties convinced some of the
necessity of a more stringent supervision of banks, and of independent audits.”13
In the 1891 Bank Act review, the government tightened the financial requirements for banks,
adopting legislation that compelled banks to deposit with the minister of finance five per cent
of their notes in circulation. As well, the paid-in capital requirement was raised to $250,000
(this figure equates to about $10.7 million in current dollars14). The five per cent requirement
can be considered to be a proxy for a modern-day leverage requirement and, interestingly, it is
in line with the current Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions’ (OSFI) leverage
cap of about 20 times. Another change required directors to hold a certain amount of paid-up
stock, rather than subscribed stock, as a qualification for holding office. The revisions also
enabled banks to make loans on the security of warehouse goods, which greatly increased the
amount that could be loaned to a single debtor, as the previous limit had been related to the
capital base of the borrowing firm. (A problem that had to be rectified in later years was that,
by this means, a bank could have a first lien on the goods of a producer, but this fact would not
be known to other lenders, who could discover later on that the apparent security of their loan
was pre-empted by a bank lien.) 
In 1891, the Canadian Bankers Association (CBA) was established after it had become clear to
bankers and the government that a formal banking organization was required along the lines of
what already existed in the United States and Britain.15 The organization was formally
incorporated by an act of Parliament in 1900. The CBA was granted specific powers, including,
in Section 7, the power “… to establish and regulate clearing houses …” This authority was
retained until the 1980 Bank Act repealed Section 7 of the CBA Act and responsibility for the
operation of the clearing system was transferred to the Canadian Payments Association. In
1900, the president of the CBA was also given the power to appoint a curator, which arose
from the establishment under the 1890 Bank Act of the “Bank Circulation Redemption Fund.”
Under the fund, all circulating notes from a failed bank (at that time banks issued their own
notes — the Bank of Canada took over the function in 1935, although technically banks
retained the right to issue their own notes until 1967) would be redeemed from the fund, the
money in which was provided by the banks. So, as the other banks were providing the funds to
redeem any outstanding notes of a failed bank, and would obviously want to ensure that it was
done effectively and properly, it was understandable why the CBA Act initially granted the
president of the association the power to appoint a curator.16
11 Beckhart, The Banking System, 301.
12 Report from the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada (The MacMillan Commission), 1933,
paragraphs 30 to 32.
13 Beckhart, The Banking System, 303.
14 Estimated, based on the Bank of Canada’s inflation calculator, which covers the 99 years between 1914 and today,
and assuming that the 3.1 per cent average rate of inflation over that period can be extended back an additional 24
years to 1890. 
15 The information in this paragraph was graciously supplied by the Canadian Bankers Association.
16 For further details, see: Crawford and Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, Eighth Edition (1986).
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According to the MacMillan commission, “the period from 1900 to 1913 was one of
unprecedented economic development in Canada, in which the banks played a very important
part.”17 To reflect the changing circumstances, the Bank Act was subject to a number of
amendments during this period, but only one of these, in 1913, was of a nature that we would
today consider to be central to the regulatory process: provision was made for a shareholders’
audit of each bank, by auditors chosen by the shareholders, from a panel selected by the
Canadian Bankers Association and approved by the minister of finance. 
Economic conditions in Canada in the early 1920s were difficult, especially for the farming
community, which at that time represented a significant proportion of the Canadian populace.
Many farm operators were members of the Progressive party, which held the balance of power
in Parliament between the ruling Liberals and the Conservatives. Beckhart indicates that the
Progressive party promoted a view that “the banking system was diabolically responsible for
the economic maladjustments in which the farmers had become enmeshed.”18 This view was no
doubt helped along by the fact that Merchants Bank of Canada had become insolvent in 1922.
This failure, combined with the economic recession, gave rise to a strong sense among many
voters that the government needed to make changes to the laws on banking. 
Some of the key amendments in the 1923 Bank Act revisions were:19
• Pension funds of bank employees must be invested in securities that would be eligible
investments for trustees under the Trust Companies Act. (The employee pension fund of
Merchants Bank had been fully invested in shares of the bank.)
• The attendance record of directors was to be sent to shareholders along with the notice of
the annual meeting. (There was evidence that some directors of Merchants Bank had rarely
attended meetings and paid little attention to the bank’s affairs.)
• There were to be clearer and more detailed bank financial filings with the Ministry of
Finance.
• The provisions for the shareholders’ audits were rewritten and greatly strengthened.
The subject of possible government inspection of the banks was a hot topic in 1923, sparking a
number of animated debates in the House of Commons. According to Beckhart,20 “bankers
were unalterably opposed” to the idea of government inspection and in 1923 the CBA
produced a pamphlet entitled Banks and Banking, in which “several pages were devoted in an
effort to convince the public of the impossibility of government inspection.” Accordingly, the
government decided not to proceed. 
Shortly thereafter, however, the Home Bank failed and “the opposition to government bank
inspection vanished in thin air.”21 Accordingly, there were additional amendments to the act in
1924, the most significant being the establishment of the Office of the Inspector General of
Banks (OIGB). More comments on the amendments of 1923 and 1924, including with regard
to the OIGB, follow later in this paper. 
17 The MacMillan Commission, paragraph 38. 
18 Beckhart, The Banking System, 308.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 442.
21 Ibid.
5
The Armstrong Inquiry in the U.S. and the MacTavish Royal Commission on Life Insurance
In 1905, in New York State, directors and senior executives of several of the largest life
insurers in the U.S. became the focus of international attention as a result of their extravagant
lifestyles. (This would be akin to situations that have arisen in the past few years where there
has been significant media coverage regarding the levels of compensation and bonuses paid to
CEOs and other executives whose organizations received vast amounts of taxpayer support in
order to avoid liquidation.) The displays of wealth in 1905 were considered especially
improper because the life insurers concerned had large numbers of participating policyholders
who clearly were not earning high returns on their life insurance investments. Ultimately, the
New York State Legislature appointed Senator William W. Armstrong to hold a formal inquiry
into the life insurance business in the state. 
The importance of this inquiry cannot be exaggerated insofar as life insurance is concerned, but
its influence extended far beyond the life insurance industry.22 The investigation was confined
to the “Big Three” U.S. life insurance companies of the time: Equitable of the U.S., Mutual of
New York and New York Life. The inquiry found that the funds of these U.S. life insurers were
being ruthlessly exploited “for the personal advantage of the officers and directors and that
nepotism was rampant.”23 The inquiry ended up generating some 10 volumes of testimony and
uncovered a whole series of abuses, including the fact that policies frequently contained
provisions that made it difficult to claim some of the important benefits that were purportedly
available under the contracts, especially accumulated cash values. Another practice exposed by
the inquiry involved the propensity for large life insurers to actually incorporate and operate
public utility companies, railroads and other significant businesses. The inquiry concluded that
it was inappropriate for life insurers to be running other corporations rather than focusing their
endeavours on the areas for which they were originally incorporated: the underwriting of life
insurance policies. It was also evident from the inquiry hearings that the use of policyholder
funds in these other businesses led to many additional business and “insider”-type investment
opportunities for directors and senior officers of the life insurer. In terms of financial dealings,
the inquiry brought to light the fact that some of the insurers were engaged in misleading
investment transactions, designed to hide investment losses and involving illegal activities such
as forgery of documents and the fictitious sale of various securities. The inquiry led to the
indictment of senior officers of a number of the life insurers involved. 
According to the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, “The inquiry must be
viewed as part of the social and economic history of the U.S. at the turn of the century. It was
the culmination of the doctrine of laissez-faire in economic matters: that in business and
manufacturing the law of the jungle should prevail and by the survival of the fittest, true
progress would be achieved.”24
22 Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, “Canada’s Life and Health Insurance Industry: The Regulatory
Environment,” submission to the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector (1997), 2-9.
23 Ibid., 2-10.
24 Ibid., page 2-11.
6
Responding to the inquiry’s findings, the New York State Legislature enacted a series of new
regulations, including the introduction of certain standard provisions to be included in life
insurance policies. While the actual wording for inclusion in policies was not dictated by the
new law, contracts were required to provide certain minimum benefits (such as non-forfeiture
provisions that would ensure that values built up in life insurance policies were not completely
lost solely on account of premiums being briefly overdue), expressed in language that was
acceptable to the regulator. Investment powers were also constrained significantly.
Interestingly, one of the reforms prohibited any one company from writing more than $150
million in new insurance if it had $1 billion or more of insurance in force. This can be seen as
an early effort to rein in the growth of what we would today refer to as “too big to fail”
financial institutions. (The provision was revoked in a subsequent sitting of the legislature. If
that had not been the case, and if parallel provisions had been applied to banks and investment
companies, the financial landscape might be very different than it is today.) Life insurers were
also restricted in the amounts they could invest in the shares of other corporations.
The Armstrong committee revelations also had an important impact in Canada. Largely as a
result of the revelations south of the border, in 1906, the MacTavish Royal Commission on
Life Insurance was established to look into the situation in Canada. The commission
investigated the operations of every one of the then-active domestic life insurers. The
commission found that although the scale of problems was far less than what had been found
south of the border, and no instances of actual fraud or other criminal activities were unearthed,
there were numerous instances of conflicts of interest whereby directors and officers were
placed in favoured positions by means of the investment operations of the insurance companies
they represented. It is clear from the testimony of directors and officers at the time that their
view was that these benefits were entitlements of their positions. 
For reasons that are now unclear, no one seems to have wondered what was happening in
Canada’s chartered banks at this time. If directors and senior officers of life insurance
companies took the view that they were entitled to benefit personally from the investment and
other business activities of their companies, one might expect that not entirely different views
may well have been held by at least some directors and shareholders of Canadian banks.
However, no investigation along these lines took place. In light of that, it is interesting to note
that the failure of the Home Bank, reported on in the next section, was found by investigators
to be significantly attributable to self-dealing by its directors and officers. 
In any case, the main recommendations of the MacTavish report, corresponding to those of the
Armstrong inquiry, were adopted by the government of Canada by means of a new Insurance
Act in 1910. To ensure greater transparency in insurance, the superintendent of insurance was
required to publish annual reports setting out the income statements and financial positions of
insurers in great detail. Providing greater emphasis to the concept of moral suasion, the
superintendent was also empowered to publish any correspondence with insurance companies
which might be instrumental in revealing improper operational policies, and from time to time
that was actually done. (This is an approach known today as “name and shame,” but it is no
longer a significant part of the Canadian financial regulatory framework.) The new provisions
served to lay the foundation for insurance legislation in Canada, and remained its cornerstone
until the introduction of a much-revised Insurance Companies Act in 1992. 
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Although there were no specific implications for banking legislation as a result of the
MacTavish commission, in a move towards increased transparency, the Bank Act was amended
in 1923 to require registration and publicity with regard to loans made under certain provisions
of the Bank Act. This would enable members of the public to know when banks had a prior
lien on certain assets of borrowers. Also, banks were required to provide the regulator with
financial statements for any corporations in which bank or bank-related operations were being
carried out. (It is regrettable that in modern times, AIG Financial Products Corporation was not
subject to such a requirement under either U.S. or U.K. laws. In that event, insurance
regulators would not have been so unaware of its operations, which were the primary cause of
AIG’s perilous exposure to risk. See page 44 for more on AIG.) According to the Estey inquiry
report, “By 1923, the bank audit provisions required two auditors for each bank selected from
different firms and subject to replacement every two years. The auditors were required by the
Act to report to the general manager and directors of the bank on any loan exceeding one per
cent of paid-up capital which appeared to be inadequately secured.”25 The 1923 revisions also
prohibited loans or advances to bank officers in an amount of more than $10,000 (or $156,000
in 2013 dollars26), a relatively small amount by today’s standards. Under the current Bank Act,
subsection 496(2), a bank may make a loan to an officer that does not exceed the larger of
twice the officer’s annual salary or $100,000.
Failure of the Home Bank and the McKeown Royal Commission of 1924
In 1923, the Home Bank failed, giving rise to significant public controversy and political
pressure on the government of the day. The bank had been incorporated in 1903 and had
focused on building its business in Western Canada through a regional office in Winnipeg.
With significant numbers of loans to the agricultural sector, it found itself exposed when that
sector ran into hard times with declining grain prices in the early 1920s. In an effort to
continue to operate, the bank took to capitalizing interest on overdue loans and rewriting them
as new loans in order to avoid booking losses. Other practices generally regarded as
unacceptable were also adopted to make the bank’s position look better than was actually the
case. Related-party transactions were substantial relative to the bank’s financial resources. The
independent auditor never qualified the bank’s financial statements, on the grounds that the
auditor’s job was “not to second-guess management practices.” Several members of the board
of directors, lacking any semblance of proper corporate governance, aided and abetted the
deception. The minister of finance had been alerted to bad practices by several other Home
Bank directors as early as 1915 and again in 1918, but for whatever reason no action was ever
taken by the government.27
The McKeown royal commission was appointed to look into the Home Bank failure. According
to Lew and Richardson, “The Commission determined that the bank was probably insolvent at
the time of the complaints to the Minister of Finance and that statements issued by management
and attested to by the auditor did not fairly reflect the financial position of the bank. The
president, vice-president, five directors and the bank accountant were all convicted of fraud.”28
25 Estey Inquiry Report, Appendix A, page 352.
26 Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator.
27 Byron Lew and Alan J. Richardson, “Institutional Responses to Bank Failure: A Comparative Case Study of the
Home Bank (1923) and Canadian Commercial Bank (1985) Failures,” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 3 (1992):
163-183.
28 Ibid., 171.
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The liquidator of the bank, G.T. Clarkson, is quoted in the Globe newspaper of Dec. 7, 1923,
as saying “the bank’s insolvency is due to the fact that there was no proper fulfilment of the
functions for which it was chartered, and because of the lack of experienced management,
disregard of the safeguards by which the business of all efficiently managed banks are
protected, and lastly because of serious losses incurred from loans in which executive officers
were interested or loans which were made to companies in which certain of the directors or
officers were shareholders.”
In another edition of the Globe (Nov. 10, 1923, page 4) a member of Parliament who had
carried out a survey of the officers of U.S. banks, reported that one of his experts from south of
the border indicated: “Nearly all bank failures can be attributed to crookedness, wildcatting or
mismanagement; there have been very few failures due to conditions over which the bank had
no control.” 
The failure of the Home Bank was front-page news across the country for many months. In
many cases, meetings of depositors almost came to blows with the government and legal
experts who were attempting to deal with the failure in an orderly manner. The general feeling,
expressed with considerable passion, was that the government should make all the depositors
whole. As one depositor indicated to the Globe (Dec. 8, 1923): “When the Government gives a
certain group of men a charter to carry on a banking business and take the people’s money in
trust, it should make sure that those men are capable and competent.” 
As a result of its investigation, the McKeown commission concluded that the government had
a moral, if not a legal responsibility to depositors, this arising as a result of not having acted on
the complaints of improper practices which were lodged with the minister of finance in earlier
years. After the bank failed, the government partially compensated depositors for their losses
(35 per cent of deposits for amounts of less than $500 and 25 per cent of other deposits),29
mainly because of the commission’s findings of moral responsibility. The commission
determined, based on financial information available at the time, that had action been taken in
1918 when some directors of the bank were filing complaints with the minister of finance, it
would have been possible to merge the bank with a stronger institution, or even to wind down
its affairs, and depositors would not have suffered losses. 
In Parliament, there was much debate as to what steps should be taken to strengthen the bank
regulatory system, with broad and varied provisions given consideration, including the
possibility of deposit insurance and the establishment of a central bank. In the end, the main
result was to amend the Bank Act in 1924 to provide for the creation of the Office of the
Inspector General of Banks. But according to Lew and Richardson, not much really changed:
“The inspector’s responsibilities did not differ greatly from those held previously by the
Minister and he would have few staff, further limiting an expansion of authority through
the office.”30
There had previously been reluctance by government to introduce a requirement for bank
inspections because there was a fear that that would make the government liable for any
failures. The new law contained a specific provision that the government would not become
liable as a result of the power of inspection contained in the 1924 amendments to the Bank Act. 
29 Beckhart, The Banking System, 481.
30 Lew and Richardson, “Institutional Responses,” 172.
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Beckhart indicates, with regard to the 1924 version of the act, “the statute is a lengthy
document of some 90 pages, which makes it a close rival in size to the National Bank Act of
the United States, and as a matter of passing interest, it is the most complete and detailed
general banking law existing in any part of the British Empire.”31
Lew and Richardson recap the development of banking regulation in Canada: “In 1867 note
insurance was provided to all banks, then in 1871 with the Bank Act, formal barriers to entry
were erected. However, to deflect the growing potential financial liability or fiscal crisis facing
the state in the event of bank failures, operational responsibility was gradually moved to
‘independent’ agencies. First, an independent bank audit was instituted in 1910, upgraded to
require a state-sanctioned professionally incorporated auditor in 1923, and finally in 1924 a
state inspector was introduced.”
The dual-audit system introduced in 1923 and the creation of the OIGB with inspection powers
in 1924 comprised the basic system of bank regulation in Canada until the mid-1980s.
The MacMillan Royal Commission on Banking and Currency
In the preceding sections of this report, we have made reference to the 1933 MacMillan
commission. One of the important terms of reference for that commission was to consider
whether Canada should have a central bank. It is worth reminding ourselves that this
commission was acting in the depths of the Great Depression. Nevertheless, as the commission
expresses in its report, “The Canadian banks give admirable evidence of security, efficiency
and convenience. In a time of universal economic difficulty, the Canadian banks have stood
firm and have continued to render to the people of the Dominion the same high quality and the
same wide variety of services as in the past.”32
Based on the text of the commission report, it is clear that with the severe economic trials
posed by the Depression, international consensus was converging on the view that modern
financial systems, and especially the derivation and application of monetary policy by
governments, required independent advice from professionals, such as would be provided
through a central bank. As well, these were the early days of economic policy making — the
report indicates that at the time of writing in 1933: “new methods and new terms are, as a
result of manifold and prudent experiment, steadily but effectively gaining acceptance.”33
The MacMillan commission report states: “By a majority, (The Chairman, Sir Charles Addis
and Mr. Brownlee; Sir Thomas White and Mr. Beaudry Leman dissenting) we recommend that
a central bank for Canada be forthwith established.”34 So, despite the strong statements of
support for a central bank that were included in the body of the report, the favourable 
31 Beckhart, The Banking System, 321.
32 Report of the MacMillan Royal Commission on Banking and Currency, Volume II, 61.
33 Ibid., 62.
34 Ibid., Chapter VIII, paragraph 293.
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recommendation was made with a majority of only one commissioner.35 The government
accepted the commission’s recommendation and the Bank of Canada was founded in 1934 and
became a Crown corporation in 1938. Its basic objective has not changed since its creation: “to
regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation.” The bank
functions as an independent agency accountable to the government of Canada.
While Canada was developing a banking system comprised of a small number of large banks,
each having local branches, in the United States, small, local banks were the norm. The Bank
of Canada website provides the following insights into the reasons for this completely different
pattern of development:
“The banking system that developed in Canada was quite different from that in the
neighbouring United States. South of the border, a different philosophy encouraged
the development of independent local banks, and a larger population, clustered in
established communities, made it workable.
“In Canada, the continuing British influence was reflected in the preference for a
limited number of banks with multiple branches. In the years leading up to
Confederation, small rural settlements spread over an extended area made branch
banking a practical approach. In a relatively undeveloped economy, branch banks
could be established with less capital and fewer skilled officers than would have
been required for independent banks at each location.
“The branch bank network was sufficient to the nation's needs for almost a century.
The chartered banks provided the bulk of notes in circulation and could meet
seasonal or unexpected demands. The larger banks were able to deal with
government business without strain, and the branch network gradually developed a
system for clearing cheques between banks.”
From shortly after the time of Confederation to the mid-1900s, one cannot help but take note of
the tremendous degree of consolidation that took place in the banking industry. At the time of
Confederation there were 35 active banks, and the number increased to 51 by 1874, a number
that would not be attained again until the revision of the Bank Act to permit Schedule B banks
in 1980.36 By 1900, the number of chartered banks had reduced by 24; seven had been merged
with other banks and 17 had failed or had their charters repealed.37 By 1918, the number had
declined to 19, and by the time the MacMillan commission reported in 1933, the number was
down to 10.38 By 1961, there were only eight chartered banks in Canada.39 The reduction in 
35 Perhaps we receive a hint of the Canadian irritation — which may have been widespread at the time — in being
regarded as a colonial possession, when the dissenting Beaudry Leman of Montreal commenced his minority report
with the somewhat sarcastic remarks: “It will undoubtedly be considered presumptuous that I should express
opinions at variance with with those of my colleagues, and particularly of the emminent and experienced gentlemen
from Great Britain, who have been requested to study our Canadian financial problems and to advise the Dominion
government in regard to their solution.” 
36 Estey Inquiry, Appendix A, 364.
37 Ibid.
38 Report from the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada (1933), paragraph 42.
39 Estey inquiry, Appendix A, 364.
numbers over time was, not surprisingly, accompanied by a concentration of assets in the
largest banks. “By the 1920’s over 50 per cent of banking assets were held by the three largest
banks, three quarters by the largest nine.”40 By the time of the Porter commission in 1964, the
three largest banks owned a striking 70 per cent of total banking assets.41,42
However, quoting from the Estey inquiry report, “In the late 1960’s, interest in the formation of
new banks revived.” The Bank of British Columbia was established in 1967 along with the
Bank of Western Canada which never came into operation. The Unity Bank of Canada was
established in 1972.”43 There was particular pressure from Western Canada for additional banks
to be headquartered in that part of the country. At a Western Economic Opportunities
conference in 1973, the premiers of the four western provinces released a joint statement: “The
branch banking system, characterized by the five major Canadian chartered banks with
branches coast to coast, and head offices in central Canada, has not been adequately responsive
to western needs.” 
Investors stepped in to fill this apparent market niche and, in 1975, Canadian Commercial
Bank and Northland Bank were incorporated and headquartered in Calgary and Edmonton,
respectively. But as most readers of this paper will be aware, neither case had a happy ending.
Their stories will be briefly recounted later in this paper.
The Porter Royal Commission on Banking and Finance
In 1964, the Porter commission was charged with responsibility “(a) to enquire into and report
upon the structure and methods of operation of the Canadian financial system, including the
banking and monetary system and the institutions and processes involved in the flow of funds
through the capital-market; and (b) to make recommendations for the improvement of the
structure and operations of the financial system”.
By the date of the commencement of the Porter commission, it noted that the Canadian
economy had grown significantly in size compared to 1933 when Lord MacMillan oversaw the
preparation of his royal-commission report. Total financial institution assets at the earlier date
were just $5.5 billion, compared to $47 billion when Porter’s commission was at work. In
1964, Canadian banks continued to be small in number but large in assets, with eight chartered
banks as compared to 10 at the time of the MacMillan commission in 1933. However, the
largest three banks continued to represent 70 per cent of total assets, as was the case in 1933. 
40 Lew and Richardson, “Institutional Responses,” 94, 99.
41 Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Porter Commission).
42 Commenting on the decline in the number of banks up until 1929, the publication date of The Banking System of
Canada, Beckhart reports (page 325): “The tendency toward fewer and larger banks has been perhaps the
outstanding characteristic of the banking structure of Canada within recent years. Not that the disappearance of
banking institutions is a condition peculiar to the Dominion, for the same condition has manifested itself also in other
countries.” And in a footnote on page 328, in relation to the trend of consolidation, he points out: “It might be noted
that such a condition leads inevitably into a kind of government guarantee of banking. The Canadian government
could not allow any of the larger banks to fail for such would be most disastrous to the entire economic structure of
the country.” 
43 Estey Inquiry, Appendix A, 364.
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The Bank Act had been amended in 1954 to give banks the power to make National Housing
Association (i.e., government-guaranteed) mortgage loans, and to make personal loans secured
by chattel mortgages on personal property (e.g., car loans). At the same time, the Canadian
Mortgage and Housing Corp. introduced mortgage loan insurance, taking on the mortgage risk
for cases where there was at least a 25 per cent down payment, thereby making home
ownership significantly more accessible to Canadians. These amendments permitted banks to
enter the business of household lending in a serious way. 
Following the recommendations of the Porter commission, in 1967, bank powers were further
broadened to remove the previously established interest rate ceiling of six per cent on bank
loans, which, as interest rates rose above this level during the 1960s, had effectively forced
banks out of the mortgage-lending market. The Porter commission also recommended that
banks should have freedom to make conventional (i.e., uninsured) mortgage loans, and that the
maximum loan-to-value ratio be increased from 66.67 per cent to 75 per cent. Both of these
recommendations were accepted and the Bank Act was amended accordingly in 1967. Banks
were now in a position to help fuel the rapidly increasing demand for residential housing and
their mortgage-loan books grew substantially as a result. Mainly because of the restrictions on
mortgage lending, which did not apply to trust companies and credit unions, banks’ assets as a
per cent of total financial system assets had declined over the 30 years since the MacMillan
commission and, according to the Porter commission report, this was from 44.4 per cent of the
total in 1935 to 34.9 per cent by 1962.44
The Porter commission report also points out that between 1933 and 1964, the credit union and
caisse populaire movement expanded substantially, having had total assets of less than $10
million in 1933 but by 1964 having become a more significant factor in the Canadian financial
system with total assets of $1.5 billion. At the time of the Porter commission, mutual funds
were proliferating and by then accounting for 1.7 per cent of financial-institution assets,45 while
they were unknown in 1933. Strong demand for consumer goods between 1933 and 1964 had
caused the total assets of sales-finance companies to grow from $75 million to $2 billion over
the period. With the growth in population and family formation, especially after the Second
World War, we see that pension funds also show a strong surge in growth, from a minuscule
percentage of system assets in 1935 to fully 10.8 per cent of total financial system assets by
1962.46 Given that these were the early years when baby boomers were entering the workforce,
it is perhaps not surprising that the Porter commission report refers to “the relatively new”
pension business.
The Porter commission was not specifically charged with considering the regulatory landscape,
but it did recommend that all significant transactions involving bank share ownership should be
subject to prior governmental approval. The commission report mentions47 that, while not
ruling out bank mergers or acquisitions, such approval requirements would “ensure that an
excessive concentration of power does not develop.” In fact, rather than adopting the
“transaction approval” approach recommended by Porter, the government of the day chose, in  
44 Porter Commission, Volume 1, Table 6-3, 107.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., Volume 4, 564.
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the 1967 amendments to the Bank Act, to introduce specific share-ownership restrictions for
Canadian banks: no individual shareholder, or group of related shareholders, would be
permitted to control more than 10 per cent of the shares of a chartered bank. In addition to
meeting the Porter commission objective of ensuring that no one entity would have inordinate
influence over the Canadian economy, the rule also served to prevent foreign takeovers of
Canadian chartered banks. The so-called “10 per cent rule” also served to somewhat mitigate
the risk of self-dealing in the banking field because, with the ownership constraint, it would be
difficult for any individual shareholder to engineer transactions that would be primarily for its
own benefit. 
One other noteworthy aspect of the Porter commission recommendations is that the
commission seemed to have an almost prescient approach to a philosophy that is today being
adopted by more progressive regulatory authorities, with Canada at the forefront. For example,
the report indicates “we have tried to make recommendations which meet the need without at
the same time bequeathing a legacy of unnecessary rigidities and obsolete rules which leave
the financial system no discretion at all to develop those traits of vigorous innovation and
creative competition we deem essential to its success.”48 This is a good description of the
benefits of a principle-based approach as compared to a rule-based approach to regulation. 
Turning more specifically to bank regulation, we obtain a sense of the bank regulatory
environment of the times when, on page 114 of the Porter commission report, the
commissioners comment on the requirements for the establishment of a new bank: “The
Inspector General told us that apart from expecting the bank to have somewhat more capital
than the law requires and having an interest in the character and standing of the group making
application, the government does not set out other requirements.” The report goes on to
mention that the board of directors is responsible for the bank’s affairs and that “The only
restriction on their powers appears in Section 75 [of the Bank Act] which specifies that loans in
excess of 5 per cent of paid-up capital ‘to a director of the bank or to any firm or corporation
of which a director or the general manager of the bank is a member or shareholder’ must be
approved by two-thirds of the directors present, and the director may not be present at the
discussion of any loan in which he has an interest. About 30 per cent of the banks' authorized
lines of credit of $100,000 or more at the end of 1962 were to directors, their firms, or
corporations of which they were officers or directors, or were guaranteed by them.” Today,
transactions with related parties are much more restricted than was the case at the time of the
Porter commission.
A Time of Change — 1965 to 1985
The Porter commission brings us up to the mid-1960s in our look back over milestone events
in the evolution of Canada’s financial regulatory system. Between 1965 and 1985, there were
no royal commissions or other major investigations of the financial system so let us continue
this story by briefly adopting a more personal perspective — that of the author of this paper,
who in 1966 was a new recruit at the Department of Insurance (DOI), one of the two
predecessor organizations to today’s OSFI.49
48 Porter Commission, Volume 1, 8.
49 The Department of Insurance and the Office of the Inspector General of Banks were merged in 1987 to form the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).
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At that time, the largest life insurance companies were the Canadian mutuals: Canada Life,
Confederation Life, Great-West Life, London Life, Manufacturers Life and Sun Life. The
property/casualty insurance business was highly fragmented, but most of the larger insurers
were members of international groups with professional management. Canadian-owned
property/casualty insurers tended to be smaller and were mostly controlled by members of the
Canadian establishment. In fact, at that time, the financial system as a whole tended to be
relationship-driven with, for example, significant lending decisions being based more on the
identity of the principals than on the underlying terms of the proposed deal. No insurance
companies were publicly listed. All of the insurers of the day followed conservative operating
policies and had low levels of leverage. Minimum solvency requirements for property/casualty
insurers, albeit unsophisticated, were included in the law. (For example, section 103 of the
Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act (the C&B Act) required general insurers to
maintain a minimum margin of assets over liabilities equal to 15 per cent of total unearned
premiums and outstanding claim provisions.) Life insurance companies were not subject to any
specified minimum solvency requirement, mainly because at that time, the actuarial reserves
tended to be so conservatively determined that even if a life insurer had liabilities equal to its
assets (i.e., no equity at all), it was thought that it would still be able to meet all policyholder
obligations. 
Insurance companies were required to submit detailed annual financial filings to the
department for review, supplemented by interim financial and investment filings during the
year. The annual filings were extensive, running to more than 80 pages, and were in addition to
a requirement for annual audited financial statements. Insurers’ investments were highly
constrained, having to be judged “eligible” under the conservative investment provisions of the
C&B Act. For example, common shares were only eligible if they had paid a dividend of at
least four per cent of their value in the capital-stock account of the company in at least four of
the previous five years. This effectively limited common share investments to so-called blue
chip stocks. Notwithstanding this high standard for common share investments, the total
common share investment of each insurer was limited to a maximum of 20 per cent of assets.
Few insurers were anywhere near the 20 per cent limit. Debt securities were subject to a strict
interest-coverage test, but if a corporation’s common stock qualified for investment, then all of
its debt securities also qualified. The C&B Act included a “basket clause,” which provided
relief from the strict investment rules, for up to seven per cent of total assets. Even so, few
insurers had any basket-clause holdings. These conservative investment rules were a legacy of
the MacTavish commission recommendations of some 50 years earlier.
While the regulatory framework of the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act
restricted straightforward related-party transactions, such as the loaning of insurance company
funds to other corporations controlled by the controlling shareholder of the insurance company,
there remained plenty of scope for self-dealing. For example, it was possible for shareholders
to purchase an insurance company on a 100 per cent leveraged basis, but then for the new
owners to strip surplus funds from the insurer by way of management fees and other
transactions, which in turn would be used to liquidate the borrowings that had been used to
fund the original purchase. In other words, the insurer’s own funds could be used to pay for its
purchase, but leave the insurer in a weaker financial position and its policyholders insured but
with a much less secure institution. 
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An additional area that was open for non-arm’s-length exploitation was in the realm of
reinsurance. Reinsurance transactions could be structured with shareholder-owned reinsurance
companies based in jurisdictions of convenience. The many variables involved in reinsurance
contracts made it easy to strip funds from a Canadian insurance company and transfer them to
a group-owned reinsurer in a tax-free jurisdiction. 
Regulation at that time was mainly by moral suasion. If an operational policy of an insurer
appeared to be in some way dubious, a call to the CEO or chairman (likely the same person)
from the federal superintendent of insurance would almost certainly guarantee that the policy
would be changed. In this type of environment, there seemed to be little requirement for
complex legal and regulatory provisions or for invasive regulatory actions. 
The DOI did carry out on-site inspections of every insurer at least once every three years, as
required by the C&B Act. However, it has to be said that many of the on-site procedures
merely consisted of duplicating work that would have already been carried out by the auditor,
such as reconciling the general ledger and physically confirming the existence of the insurer’s
investments. On-site visits were performed according to a long-ago established schedule,
repeated routinely over a three-year cycle. As can happen in bureaucracies over time, many on-
site procedures were carried out by rote and in some cases, if there ever was a sound reason for
establishing the procedure, it may have long ago been forgotten by working-level employees.
Also, circumstances may have changed over the years so that the procedure may no longer
have been at all relevant. A considerable amount of financial and operational data had to be
submitted to the DOI by the insurers, but for the most part it served only to assess compliance
with a few quantitative requirements that were specified in the statute. Until the mid-1970s,
there was no actual financial analysis of the submitted data, making use of well-established
financial ratios, looking at their trends over time, and so on. In general it can be said that there
was little or no consideration of risk, either in terms of planning work, carrying out on-site
procedures or taking regulatory action. The rule-based mentality dictated that moral suasion
could be exercised when it became clear that problems had developed, but not before. Of
course, by the time problems actually develop, it may be too late to fix them — hence the
proactive, risk-based approach of today, where the idea is to prevent problems from occurring,
rather than allowing them to occur and then trying to fix them. 
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, if we take stock at the end of the 1970s, no Canadian life
insurer had ever failed, it had been more than 50 years since the last Canadian bank failure
(Home Bank in 1923) and the last failure of a property/casualty insurer had also been about
50 years in the past. 
What were the risks at that time? Given the extremely conservative investment stance, market
risk would be judged as minimal by today’s standards. Because of the traditional approaches to
running their businesses, simple products and no dependence on IT, operational risk also
tended to be quite low. Strong capital positions, far in excess of the minimum requirement,
further buttressed the insurers’ financial strength. Thus, perhaps one reason that risk assessment
was not a significant factor in the regulatory toolkit, was that the business was carried out in a
traditional manner, with little evidence of the dynamism and competitive forces that are
hallmarks of today’s financial world. 
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However, during the latter part of the 1970s, it began to become clear that the winds of change
were blowing through the relatively tranquil insurance world described above. This was
evidenced by changes taking place in the underlying ownership and management structure of
the industry, along with the appearance of new market entrants, which had previously been few
and far between. Entrepreneurial players began to be attracted to the business, probably for two
reasons. First, there was a view, which had some basis in fact, that the insurance business was
somewhat sleepy but had the potential to generate a high return on investment. And second, the
then-simplistic regulatory environment with its lack of effective controls on self-dealing,
offered considerable potential for accessing what some perceived to be “excess” capital, which
in their view could be better employed in other businesses.
This change in the outlook and approach of financial system players during these years was
commented on by Ron Suskind in his recent book, Confidence Men.50 He refers to Paul
Volcker, the former U.S. Treasury secretary, as “part of the mid-century’s community of
prudent men, referees on the field of play, making sure conduct was fair, and cheap shots led to
real penalties — and to social sanction. Nothing was worth risking that.” Suskind then quotes
Volcker, speaking about the obvious abuses that were revealed as a result of the sub-prime
mortgage crisis: “There are those like me who say the heart of this system ought to be the
banking system, like it was historically, and it ought to be a service organization to take care of
the basic needs for its clients … Its big job is providing someplace for their money, transferring
funds around the country, making loans, helping them with investments and the rest. They
shouldn’t get off doing hedge funds and equity and trying to make all their money by trading.
That’s my view.” 
By the end of the 1970s, it was also becoming clear that the rule-based investment regime set
out in the insurance law was being subjected to considerable “reinterpretation.” In a classic
illustration of the weaknesses of rule-based systems, legal firms began to purchase tiny
corporate entities, such as companies that had been owned by retiring dentists, strictly to take
advantage of the entity’s established dividend record. Then, the tiny corporation with the five-
year dividend record could be restructured, merged with an existing corporation and its
dividend record utilized to facilitate a huge IPO, which would be deemed to be an eligible
investment for insurance companies registered under the C&B Act and the Foreign Insurance
Companies Act. Many investment trusts and other investment schemes required the “legal for
life” designation as a standard for investment purposes, so a positive opinion with regard to
being an eligible investment for insurers also opened the door to many other potential buyers
of the security concerned. 
As a result of these and other similar machinations, the apparently conservative investment
rules began to have less and less significance in terms of their implications for market risk of
insurance companies. Clearly, the world that currently surrounds us is very different from the
world that Paul Volcker was most familiar with — and with the world we have described in the
insurance field in the mid-1960s.
50 Ron Suskind, Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington and the Education of a President (New York: Harper Collins,
2011): 288.
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We have been speaking in general terms about rising risk profiles and entrepreneurialism, but
to actually provide the flavour of the times, let us briefly describe a few of the actual scenarios
that played out on the regulatory front for non-life insurance companies:
• There was the case of the insurance company that was reinsuring with a bogus reinsurance
broker in the London market, and was accepting the risks in the name of another Canadian
insurer, but without any notification to the latter insurer, with reinsurance monies disappearing
somewhere in the chain of transactions. The ceding insurer was rendered insolvent.
• There was the case of the insurance company CEO who was defrauding his insurer. The
regulator gathered evidence and wrote to the board members, pointing out the evidence
without naming who might be responsible for the losses. The board members refused to
take any action. The CEO was subsequently found guilty of fraud, but the company was
insolvent by the time he could be arrested and charged.
• There was the insurer that was ceding business to a reinsurer in a tax-haven jurisdiction,
while hiding the fact that that reinsurer was actually owned by the shareholders of the
insurance company — that is, it was a non-arm’s-length situation and the reinsurance
arrangements were rigged so as to deplete the capital base of the insurer while transferring
funds tax-free from the Canadian insurance company to its shareholders in the tax-haven
jurisdiction. This type of situation actually arose with a number of insurers. 
• There was the case of the Canadian insurer with an inadequate capital level that undertook
a huge volume of high-risk motorcycle business in the U.S., this after having signed an
undertaking with the DOI that it would not write any significant volume of such business
unless it first bolstered its capital base by a substantial amount. The undertaking
notwithstanding, and with no additional capital, the company went ahead with a grand
expansion of the U.S. business, which it did not report in its monthly returns to the DOI.
When the real financial figures became available, the company had been rendered
insolvent. As to the undertaking with regard to the U.S. business, the company merely
stated that the undertaking had been inadvertently overlooked. 
• There was the case of the entrepreneur who purchased an ailing insurer, subject to the
condition that, in order to maintain the company’s licence, additional capital would be
injected. The capital was increased by about half of the agreed-upon amount, with the other
half to be paid within a few months. On the strength of that, the company’s licence was
renewed and the transfer of ownership took place. Shortly thereafter, when DOI inspectors
visited the company, they found that the newly injected capital had been transferred back to
the personal bank account of the entrepreneur. The Department of Justice, representing the
DOI, sued the entrepreneur for the missing funds, plus the funds that had been promised.
But while the legal wrangling carried on, the insurer had to be closed due to insolvency.
The non-arm’s-length practices and other gyrations mentioned above were not generally
precluded by the insurance law of the time, although the risks to policyholders could be
significant. In fact, we can say that most of the situations described above would have simply
been unimaginable in the 1960s. However, as the 1970s progressed, the implications of the
changing environment were becoming clear to the insurance regulators of the day.
Nevertheless, they were powerless to do anything other than harangue the concerned
companies and shareholders in an effort to get them to change their practices. Unfortunately, by
that point in time (the late 1970s and early 1980s), the concept of moral suasion had become
pretty much meaningless to those for whom the message really mattered.
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To be clear, these types of situations were certainly not occurring with main-line insurers,
which continued to go about their business in a professional manner. Nevertheless, insurers like
the ones mentioned above, and others that we could mention, tended to take up huge amounts
of regulatory resources. As well, the Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation
Corporation (the “deposit insurance” parallel for general insurance companies) was only
established in 1987, so for cases between 1980 and 1985, some policyholders were badly hurt.
When a property/casualty insurer fails, most policyholders (i.e., those with no claim
outstanding) lose a relatively small amount — the amount of their unearned premium. But if
you happen to be one of the unfortunate ones with an outstanding claim — say your house has
burned down and you now find that your insurance is worthless — it is a life-changing event.
The pain of the insolvency falls disproportionately on those who have experienced claims. 
The run of insurer insolvencies actually extended into the 1990s, with Canada’s first-ever life
insurance company failures: Les Coopérants in 1992, followed by Sovereign Life in 1993 and
then, in 1994, one of Canada’s largest and oldest life insurance companies, Confederation Life.
And as we will discuss in more detail below, both the Canadian Commercial Bank and the
Northland Bank failed in 1986, more than 60 years since the time of the Home Bank collapse
in 1923. Finally, as we will also comment on in more detail below, the 1980s saw the collapse
of some 23 trust companies in Canada. 
We suggest that, substantially due to the increasingly entrepreneurial approach to insurance and
other financial businesses, a long period of quite stable financial-institution operation was
drawing to an end. For example, after almost 50 years without a significant failure, in the six-
year period between 1979 and 1985, seven Canadian property/casualty insurers became
insolvent.51 For most of those seven insurers (Mennonite Mutual was an exception), the CEO
was also a controlling or substantial shareholder, and in a number of those cases, the CEO was
also the chair of the board of directors. Also, in a number of the cases, the CEO/shareholder
had other business interests, and in the recessionary climate of the early 1980s, the insurance
companies were sometimes regarded as a ready source of funding. For insurers involved in
self-dealing, as well as other improper and high-risk practices, efforts to apply moral suasion
were typically greeted by the phrase “where does it say in the law that we cannot do that?”
Corporate governance was virtually non-existent for these insurers, although that did not mean
that they were contravening the requirements of the C&B Act. 
Officers of the Department of Insurance lacked the relatively sophisticated methods of risk
assessment and risk classification that are in use by the OSFI today, but it was nevertheless clear
at the time that these were high-risk situations. Fortunately, there was ample documentation of
the extensive correspondence and minutes of meetings involving the troubled companies, with
clear regulatory diagnoses of the problems and urgent requests for action by management and
shareholders (often the same people). The House standing committee on finance, chaired by MP
Don Blenkarn, held hearings into these insurance company failures. The initial reaction of
committee members was that “the regulators must have been asleep at the switch to allow this to
happen.” However, when all the evidence was in, there was, to our knowledge, no criticism of
the DOI. And shortly thereafter, in 1985, an important point in the federal government’s green
paper on regulatory reform was the need to provide regulators with power to intervene directly
in companies’ affairs when circumstances clearly dictate that action is required. 
51 Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation Corporation website at www.pacicc.com. The companies were:
Strathcona General Insurance, Pitts Insurance, Cardinal Insurance, Northern Union Insurance, Canadian Great Lakes
Surety, Mennonite Mutual Hail Insurance and Northumberland Insurance.
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With hindsight, we can see that the changing conditions in the financial markets were part of a
more fundamental shift in the entire socio-economic environment that was emerging at that
time. Technological change was occurring at an exponential rate, facilitating a more rapid pace
of business activity generally, and leading to new products such as daily-interest chequing
accounts and to the introduction of ATM machines, greatly increasing consumer convenience.
(But as pointed out in the Wyman Report discussed below, the new technology also facilitated
“rapid transfers of short term funds in large amounts across international boundaries at the
slightest hint of danger.”) This period also saw the coming of age of the baby boom generation,
with higher levels of education and increased mobility of citizens, all leading to decreasing
customer loyalty and growing expectations for improved service and more innovative products. 
All in all, these developments were giving rise to an increasingly competitive marketplace for
all types of products, including financial services. And the competitive environment was not
limited to consumer products and services: competition exists for shareholder funds as well as
for primary-level products, and many financial institutions were finding it necessary to accept
higher levels of risk in order to generate returns that would be judged acceptable by their
shareholders. 
The Estey Inquiry into the Collapse of the CCB and Northland Bank
The small western banks that failed in 1986, Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) and Northland
Bank, were part of this new spirit of financial entrepreneurialism that was emerging in North
American financial markets. The main problem for both CCB and Northland was that these
banks lacked the gravitas to attract large clients, and thus, found that most of their business
consisted of loans to small, western-based businesses, and often to entities whose loan
applications had already been declined by the large chartered banks. Their loan portfolios,
therefore, typically consisted of transactions with a less credit-worthy sector of the economy,
often including members of cyclical real-estate and energy businesses. It was precisely these
types of businesses that were the hardest hit by the early-1980s recession, which was
particularly severe in western Canada. 
According to the Estey inquiry report, “The evidence is open to the interpretation that the
improvident lending practices of these banks created a demand from those lacking in the
capacity to repay their borrowings and to whom credit should not have been extended.”52
Unlike the situation with the insurance companies, the bank regulator of the day, the Office of
the Inspector General of Banks, did not seem to be aware of the significant risk levels that
were building up in the two small banks. With regard to the failure of Northland Bank, the
Estey commission commented: “It is necessary in the face of the record compiled by this
Commission to conclude that although the OIGB was in possession of all the information
essential to a true comprehension of the state of affairs in Northland, awareness did not come.
Even if it had, the will to respond was missing.”53
52 Estey Inquiry Report, Volume 1, 2. 
53 Ibid., 10.
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Regulatory ineffectiveness was also cited by Estey as a significant factor in the ultimate failure
of CCB: “The OIGB, by reason of its position in the statutory pattern for the regulation of
banks, must bear much, but not all of the blame for this condition and for what transpired. As
mentioned earlier, the Inspector General was aware of the state of the bank and failed to act.”54
One must recall that while the Office of the Inspector General of Banks had been established in
the 1920s, even some 60 years later in the 1980s there was no established tradition of hands-on
bank regulation in Canada. The mandate of the OIGB was essentially to rely on the auditor and
the audited financial statements as being sufficient to reveal the true financial position of every
bank. The OIGB carried out no on-site inspections and had no tradition of probing to
understand the operational details behind the reported figures. In the U.K., which as in many
areas of activity had great influence on the pattern for Canada, there was no bank regulatory
statute at all until 1979, and in fact it was only in 1987 when the impact of European Union
rules began to be felt that the Bank of England was given the power to request information
from banks and to carry out inspections.55 From today’s perspective this historical information
about U.K. bank regulation seems almost incredible. 
The marked differences between the regulatory regimes for banking and insurance during the
1980s and prior were reflected in the staffing requirements of the respective insurance and
banking regulatory bodies. In the early 1980s, the Department of Insurance had a total of
approximately 75 employees operating out of offices in Ottawa, Toronto, Halifax, Montreal,
Winnipeg and Vancouver.56 By contrast, in 1984 the Office of the Inspector General of Banks
had only 14 employees classified as inspectors, analysts or the equivalent, working from a
single office in Ottawa.57 A sense of the somewhat hands-off approach of the bank regulators is
also conveyed by the comments mentioned earlier (see page 12) from the Porter commission,
indicating that the OIGB did not have particularly stringent requirements for new bank
incorporations. Banks were, in a sense, expected to self-regulate, as the provisions in the Bank
Act and regulations were much more substantial than were the resources allocated for their
oversight. 
One might reasonably wonder about how two federal financial regulatory agencies, the OIGB
and DOI, could be following such different operational policies. We suspect that the DOI’s
more hands-on approach to regulation was grounded in the MacTavish commission’s findings
early in the century, which recommended quite detailed oversight for insurance companies.
Comparable recommendations were never made in the banking area, even after the failure of
Home Bank in 1923. As to why the differences persisted, apparently without any attention
being given to the policy dichotomy between the two agencies, we can only suspect that as
often seems to happen, organizations do not have a natural tendency to work together: during
some periods, their head offices were actually located in the same office building in Ottawa. 
54 Ibid., 17.
55 Charles Proctor, The Law and Practice of International Banking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), paragraph
1.04.
56 Personal recollection by author.
57 Estey Inquiry Report, 45.
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The Trust Companies
A trust company is similar to a bank except for three important differences. First, while
banking is an exclusively federal concern, the federal government as well as provincial
governments are able to incorporate and regulate trust companies. Thus, in each province of
Canada that has incorporated trust companies, there is a department or ministry that is
responsible for their regulation. (Federal trust companies are regulated by the OSFI, and before
the OSFI was created, they were regulated by the Department of Insurance.) So, for example,
Ontario-incorporated trust companies are overseen by the Financial Services Commission of
Ontario. Second, banks are the only financial institutions to have unfettered commercial
lending powers. Trust company powers in this area differ by jurisdiction of incorporation but
generally speaking, commercial lending limits are based on capital levels. The third and
perhaps most important distinguishing feature is that trust companies are empowered to
administer trusts and to hold assets in trust for their clients. Banks do not have this power. 
While developments in bank regulation have been outlined above, the actual business powers
of banks were somewhat limited until the latter half of the 20th century. As mentioned under
the heading for the Porter commission, until 1967, banks were not empowered to engage in
conventional mortgage lending. This left a significant market niche for non-bank financial
institutions, especially after the Second World War, when the Canadian economy was growing
rapidly and the emergence of the baby boomers into their years of family formation meant that
new home purchases and concomitant mortgage lending was also subject to a vast expansion. 
The market niche was mainly filled by trust companies and credit unions, which were able to
grow quickly because of the demand for their services, which included the power to issue
residential mortgages. According to Lew and Richardson (quoting Neufeld), “in 1950 the
chartered banking sector held over half of all financial assets, but by 1965 it had declined to
only one third, due to growth in these competing sectors.”58
Trust companies reached their zenith during the 1970s and early 1980s, but relaxation of the
rules constraining banks’ ability to participate in the mortgage market enabled the banks to
gradually but inexorably increase their share of that business, at the expense of the trust
companies. Banks were also keen to be able to provide the broadest possible range of financial
services to their clients. Although trust powers were not available to them, they were able to
overcome this difficulty by acquiring trust companies and holding them as subsidiaries. An
additional factor prompting the acquisition of major trusts by chartered banks was the federal
government’s decision in 1998 not to allow mergers between Canada’s chartered banks. With
that decision, Canada’s chartered banks began to look elsewhere for growth by acquisition, and
the more substantial trust companies were logical targets. By 2000, with the acquisition of
Canada Trust by TD Bank, almost all of Canada’s major trust companies had become affiliated
with chartered banks. 
The website of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) indicates that since 1970, 43
deposit-taking institutions have failed, including CCB and Northland. Although this period of
CDIC payouts covers more than four decades, fully 53 per cent of the total number of failures
occurred during the 1980s, and except for the two banks, virtually all of the failed institutions
were trust companies. (Insurance companies are, of course, not members of CDIC.) 
58 Lew and Richardson, “Institutional Responses,” 173.
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In 1983, there was considerable public concern when the government of Ontario felt that it had
no choice but to take control of Seaway Trust, Greymac Trust and Crown Trust, as well as
several associated companies. The collapse of these institutions, widely known as “the trust
companies affair,” involved significant fraud, and the key principals, Leonard Rosenberg,
William Player and several cronies, were found guilty and served time in jail (Player was
sentenced to 15 years; Rosenberg to five years). Essentially the fraud involved the pyramiding
of property flips based on dodgy appraisals, with the “profits” from one flip being used to
finance larger flips, aided by financing provided by the trust companies that were controlled by
the principals. The final “deal” involved the resale of 10,931 apartment units in Toronto, which
had ostensibly been purchased for $271 million, with the entire package being flipped and then
flipped again, all within a few days. The final “sale,” supposedly to a group of Saudi investors,
was to be for a payment of $500 million. The sustained losses represented a substantial claim
on the CDIC depositor protection fund, to say nothing of uninsured losses of individual
depositors.
The failure of a significant number of trust companies over a 40-year period, with a particular
concentration in the 1980s, was relevant to the evolution of financial regulation because, in
combination with the bank and insurance company failures, it emphasized that there was a
newly emerged volatility in the financial system, which was having substantial impact on
financial institutions. In turn, this galvanized governments with regard to the need for a
significant restructuring of Canada’s financial regulatory system as a whole. At the same time
it has to be said that the failures of both the insurance companies and the trust companies were
not very significant to the financial system per se, because the failed institutions were small
relative to most other institutions in the financial sector. In the case of the trust companies it
was also the case that most were regulated by provincial governments and therefore subject to
regulatory regimes that were not necessarily representative of those applicable to the much
larger, federally supervised banks and insurance companies.
The 1980s: Lessons Learned
The previous pages have described how an evolving business environment for banks and
insurance companies during the 1970s was accompanied by a rising tide of incipient financial
risk. Altogether, between 1981 and 1985, the time of the federal green paper on financial
regulation, there were seven insurance company failures, 11 trust and mortgage loan company
failures, and a support package had to be extended to a small chartered bank (that being CCB,
which would ultimately fail along with Northland Bank in the following year).59 According to
the CDIC web site, 10 of the trust company failures occurred in just two years: 1985 and 1986. 
In 1985, the federal government undertook a comprehensive policy review of the whole area of
financial regulation. This was accomplished through two main initiatives: (1) The Working
Committee on the Canada Deposit Insurance System (the Wyman committee) and (2) the green
paper issued by the Department of Finance: “The Regulation of Canadian Financial
Institutions: Proposals for Discussion.”
59 Green Paper: “The Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions: Proposals for Discussion,” 11.
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Although the remit of the Wyman committee was focused on the role and operations of CDIC,
the committee felt that it should consider policy options for CDIC in the broadest possible
context, and accordingly looked at the then-existing framework for financial-institution
regulation. The committee identified many shortcomings and made valuable suggestions for
improvement. Some of the key recommendations made by the Wyman committee, which
were subsequently adapted by the government to be part of the new framework, are outlined
below:60
• The regulator should take a leadership role in determining uniform examination standards
and develop an early warning system to detect problems at an early stage.
• The regulator should develop a “performance rating system” for institutions, including
determination of appropriate “break points,” which would correspond to “various levels of
difficulty in order to standardize appropriate courses of remedial action.” (This corresponds
to the OSFI’s Guide to Intervention, which is an important component of the current risk-
based operational framework.)
• The regulator should be able to levy significant penalties against regulated institutions,
including their management, directors and professional advisers, to ensure compliance with
the statutes, regulations and guidelines.
• The regulator should have the power to become “directly involved in the affairs of problem
institutions.”
• The regulator should develop detailed standards for leverage.
It should be noted that most of the above references to “the regulator,” were actually envisaged
by the Wyman committee as being CDIC — i.e., in order to protect its position as an insurer,
CDIC would itself have a number of direct regulatory powers. The government ultimately
opted for a more neutral role for CDIC, with the main regulatory powers to be exercised
through the OSFI, but the thrust of the recommendations were considered to be worthwhile. 
The federal green paper acknowledged that the existing financial regulatory system was
outmoded, with increasing numbers of deposit-taking institutions and insurance companies
getting into financial difficulty, and the grave consequences this had had for affected
consumers, along with the potentially disruptive impact that this trend could have on the
greater economy. (The year was 1985, with the failure of Canadian Commercial Bank and
Northland Bank still to come in 1986, to be followed by other failures, including the
insolvency of the massive Confederation Life in 1994.) Accordingly, the paper emphasized,
inter alia, the following key areas for attention:
• Strictly controlling self-dealing by essentially “banning” such transactions for all federally
regulated financial institutions.
• Guarding against conflicts of interest by enhancing and clarifying the regime applicable to
conflicts of interest and also by establishing a new public body to investigate consumer and
other complaints where conflict-of-interest abuses are suspected.
• Enhancing the powers of regulators to enable them to properly carry out their
responsibilities.
60 Points are taken from the Executive Summary of The Final Report of the Working Committee on the Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the Wyman Report).
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• Clarifying and simplifying the regulatory structure, possibly by consolidating the Office of
the Inspector General of Banks and the Department of Insurance.
• Ensuring the soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system.
In addition to the two most prominent investigations of the time — the federal green paper and
the Wyman report — there were numerous other bodies that carried out investigations and
made recommendations for change. These various analyses were all prompted by the spate of
financial institution insolvencies in the 1980s, and in their totality they gave rise to a powerful
consensus that major change was needed. Table 1 below outlines key issues that were
identified after the financial failures in the 1980s, along with the important measures that were
introduced by the federal government to address them:
TABLE 1
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Formation of the OSFI to take over regulation of all federal financial
institutions. Also, formation of the Financial Institutions Supervisory
Committee (FISC), which meets quarterly to discuss systemic risk issues
and developments with regard to federally regulated financial institutions.
Members of FISC are: The OSFI, the Department of Finance, the Bank of
Canada, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Financial
Consumer Agency of Canada. 
Related-party transactions effectively prohibited, except for those of
nominal value. New requirement for conduct review committee of board
(majority of independent directors) to approve “nominal” transactions
based on being at market value and in interests of institution.
Much greater emphasis on principle-based approach, with guidance as to
interpretation.
Harmonization of regulatory framework for banking and insurance, which
means banks are subject to minimum capital requirements and regular
on-site inspections. Increasing adoption by the OSFI of international
regulatory standards in banking and insurance. (In fact, as an active
member on international committees, the The OSFI has a significant
influence on the development of these standards.)
New legislation sets out detailed responsibilities of boards of directors,
including in respect of governance, risk management, internal controls
and other key areas of financial-institution management. Also imposes
clear conflict of interest disclosure requirements and stringent “duty of
care” for directors and officers. High standards of corporate governance
are front and centre in the new financial regulatory framework. 
The OSFI develops a comprehensive risk-based approach to its regulation
of financial institutions. This requires a formalized, consistent and as-
objective-as-possible methodology for assessing risks across the range of
financial institutions. The OSFI develops a “Guide to Intervention” for the
benefit of its own personnel and for industry members, setting out the
types of OSFI responses that can be expected at different levels of risk in
institutions.
Lack of co-ordination between Office of the
Inspector General of Banks and Department of
Insurance, even though there was increasing
convergence between banking and insurance
(banks owning insurance company subsidiaries
and life insurance companies increasingly
promoting wealth-management and savings
products).
Lack of effective controls with regard to
related-party transactions.
Obvious ability of players to “get around” rule-
based regulatory regimes.
Lack of a comprehensive regulatory regime for
banking, including minimum capital
requirements and on-site inspections.
Lack of meaningful standards with regard to
corporate governance, risk management and
internal controls.
Lack of a risk-based perspective by both the
Office of the Inspector General of Banks and
the Department of Insurance.
Identified Weakness                                    Corrective Measure (1987 OSFI Act and 1992 New Legislation) 
TABLE 1 (cont’d)
These were far-reaching revisions: after many years of gradual, evolutionary change in the
regulatory laws and practices governing financial institutions, there was suddenly a tremendous
burst of creative activity. Our view is that the regulatory innovations that mostly had their
genesis in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, were an important contributing factor with regard to
Canada’s excellent performance through the recent financial crisis. 
An Apparent Paradox?
At first glance it might seem as though arguments developed in the foregoing pages give rise to
something of a paradox. On the one hand, we suggest that, to a material extent, the excellent
performance of the Canadian financial system through the recent financial crisis is largely
attributable to developments that commenced with the creation of the OSFI and the new
legislation of 1992. But on the other hand, as can be seen from the historical sections of this
paper, no Canadian banks or insurance companies had to be closed during the Great
Depression, which was an even steeper decline than that experienced during the recent crisis.
We have asserted that until the creation of the OSFI in 1987, and certainly during the 1930s,
bank regulation was relatively minimal. And, as was demonstrated by the failure of a number
of insurance companies in the 1980s and 1990s, insurance regulation was also far from
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All processes are reviewed to incorporate a risk-based perspective and a
principle-based approach to regulatory operations. Many “old” procedures
are considered to provide insufficient value-added for resources
expended, and are dropped. Replaced by risk-based procedures that are
designed to focus resources where there are the greatest risks to
individual institutions and to the financial system as a whole. 
The OSFI currently has in the neighbourhood of 600 employees and is
authorized to follow industry norms when establishing salary levels. This
means that the OSFI can employ professional actuaries, risk-management
experts, financial engineers and other personnel that are critical to
staying on top of developments in the financial industry.
In order to ensure transparency and regulatory coherence within policy
boundaries for new business development, a formal system of financial
holding companies is adopted. This will enable institutions to
accommodate new types of business within a single corporate grouping,
primarily by requiring each type of regulated business to be carried out
within a regulated entity that sits downstream from the regulated holding
company. 
Although the Department of Insurance carried
out on-site inspections and received a
considerable amount of financial data from
insurers, its regulatory processes were mainly
based on long-ago developed routines and
procedures, many of which were outmoded
and inefficient. Information obtained from on-
site inspections was not interpreted in a
consistent, risk-oriented manner. 
Insufficient recognition by government of
importance of financial regulation, as attested
to by negligible resources dedicated to bank
oversight and (by today’s standards) to
insurance regulation. Salary levels were linked
to public service, which made it difficult
(although not impossible) to attract staff
members who had qualifications and expertise
comparable to industry counterparts, making it
hard to oversee the financial industry in an
effective manner. 
Financial institutions are diversifying into new
types of businesses, directly and through
acquisitions, and this is blurring the lines of
the traditional financial pillars.
Identified Weakness                                    Corrective Measure (1987 OSFI Act and 1992 New Legislation) 
optimal, including during the time of the Great Depression. Taken together, these points might
suggest that the factors leading to the resilience of Canadian financial institutions must have
been in place long before the events of the 1980s and early 1990s. How do we reconcile an
argument that recent improvements in the regulatory framework have given rise to a world-
class system when, even 50 or 60 years before the development of that system, Canadian
institutions seemed to be able to satisfactorily ride out the greatest economic decline the
developed world has experienced?  
A situation that is not typically referenced among the historical milestones of Canadian
financial-institution development is that during the 1930s, a number of Canada’s life insurers,
most notably Sun Life, which was the largest Canadian life insurer at that time, were in fact
technically insolvent. This was common knowledge among staff members at the Department of
Insurance during the author’s tenure with the DOI. To confirm that this was not some kind of
organizational legend having no basis in fact, one may access various scholarly references on
the subject. For example, Kryzanowski and Roberts state that their research “provides
extensive evidence of the insolvency of Canada’s largest life insurance company of the day,
Sun Life. It also shows that six of nine of Sun Life’s Canadian competitors were also probably
insolvent.”61 In an earlier paper62 the authors presented evidence to show that one of Canada’s
largest banks, the Bank of Montreal, was insolvent on a market-value basis during most of the
1930s. The fact is that the government essentially colluded with the management and boards of
these institutions to mask the fact that they were technically insolvent. For example, in
responding to questions in the House of Commons about Sun Life’s solvency, then prime
minister R.B. Bennett made the following (convoluted) statement in Parliament: “My duty was
to see to it that without further instructions than those which I have indicated to the House as
values — that apart from that our officials should make a report which would enable me to say
to the people of Canada and elsewhere, who were depending on the solvency of this great
enterprise, that it was solvent.”  
Prior to its amalgamation with the OIGB in 1987 to create the OSFI, the Department of
Insurance was responsible for an annual publication known as the List of Securities, which
included all of the investments of federally licensed insurance companies, along with the DOI-
approved year-end market value for each security, to be utilized by insurers for financial-
reporting purposes. For a number of the Depression-era year-ends, the Department used what it
referred to as “authorized values,” which were not market values at all but were in fact
considerably higher. With the use of authorized values, every Canadian insurance company was
able to produce a balance sheet that showed it to be solvent. Thus the prime minister could
indicate that he had a report from his officials which would enable him to say that Sun Life
was solvent.63
61 Lawrence Kryzanowski and Gordon S. Roberts, “Capital Forbearance: Depression-era Experience of Life Insurance
Companies,” Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences (March 1998).
62 Lawrence Kryzanowski and Gordon S. Roberts, “Canadian Banking Solvency, 1922-1940,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 25, 3 (August 1993): Part 1, 361-376. 
63 Ibid.
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These Depression-era situations might be considered as representing early application of the
“too big to fail” doctrine, which in turn, would imply that there was careful analysis of the pros
and cons of the various options as part of a formalized decision-making process. On the other
hand, during a time when transparency was not a pervasive preoccupation the way it is today, it
is also possible that no government felt that it could be seen as a messenger carrying such bad
news, especially during an era of high unemployment and other dismal financial statistics, and
that that the politically expedient course of action (or inaction) was to hope that the problems
would gradually be cured over time. In thinking about this latter possibility, one must reflect on
the fact that in the several years preceding the Home Bank failure, a number of the bank’s
directors wrote to the minister of finance expressing their view that the bank was likely to
become insolvent, if that situation did not already exist, but no action was taken by the
government of the day. 
There is a fine line between regulatory forbearance as part of a well-considered “too big to
fail” policy, and pure inaction because of the lack of a political will. The author of this paper
has carried out many regulatory development projects in emerging market countries. It is not
uncommon to find that there are insolvent institutions, sometimes among the most sizable in
the marketplace, that are still actively transacting business. In most of these cases, there is no
policy of “too big to fail“; there is only a fear by ministers of the government that by being the
messenger bearing the bad news, they may be the ones to suffer, if not literally, then certainly
at the ballot box. One of the most difficult changes to make in these jurisdictions is to get the
local government and the regulator to begin meaningful measures of intervention designed to
either take an institution out of the market, or on the basis of rational policy analysis, to
conclude that the institution is too big to fail and to take whatever steps might best be
appropriate to contain the problems rather than doing nothing and having them worsen.
The McKay Task Force — Reforming Canada’s Financial Services Sector
The McKay task force, convened in 1996, was not a royal commission and it did not
particularly focus on issues related to prudential regulation, nor did it feature a review of
Canada’s financial services history, as was the case for most of the previously cited
commissions. To the extent that a regulatory perspective was adopted, it was mostly with
regard to competition and consumer service. A number of recommendations were brought
forward that were intended to increase competition among deposit takers, including reduced
capital requirements to promote the incorporation of new banks, freeing up the ability for
credit unions and caisse populaires to expand their services, and broadening the membership
of the Canadian Payments Association. There were also a number of important consumer-
related recommendations, including enhanced transparency of financial contracts, protection
of privacy, and increased emphasis on avoidance of coercive tied selling. Consumer-protection
recommendations led to the establishment of the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
and a system of financial ombudservices to look into public complaints across the financial
services sector.
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OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM TODAY
In this section, we outline the main characteristics of the Canadian financial regulatory system
as it exists today, with particular emphasis on the areas that we believe to be most responsible
for its effectiveness.
• Integrated supervision: The job of assessing risk in the financial system can be compared to
putting together a jigsaw puzzle. A person looks at all the pieces and begins to move them
around looking for a pattern to emerge, which can then be further built upon. But if there
are a number of players holding different pieces of the puzzle, it will take much longer for
anyone to recognize the image. Similarly, when there are different regulators looking at
different parts of the financial system, it is all too easy to see only a part of the picture and
therefore not recognize what is really happening. Unfortunately, this difficulty is
compounded by a characteristic of human nature whereby executives in different
institutions usually seem reluctant to share information with their counterparts in other
institutions, often because of competitive rivalries, individual egos, turf wars and so on. A
single regulatory agency (or minimal number of agencies) minimizes the potential for this
type of difficulty. 
Another advantage of an integrated approach is that it substantially diminishes the danger
that responsibility for different parts of a complex financial system, or newly developing
parts of that system, will fall between the cracks, with no regulatory agency assessing the
risks that may be emerging in that particular area. If something new is happening, each
agency may be able to quite correctly say “that is not our responsibility.” It is no one’s
responsibility because the new activity was not previously contemplated, and therefore, is
not included in the remit of any of the individual agencies. By contrast, when any new
financial institution product or activity now comes over the horizon in Canada, the OSFI, as
the sole financial regulator, is expected to begin thinking about its risk implications for the
system and for individual entities. 
• Principle-based/outcome-based approach as opposed to rule-based/compliance-based approach:
The experience of the old Department of Insurance, with its detailed investment rules,
provides a good example of the way in which rules can be subverted. As well, in the course
of our regulatory career, we have often come across situations where rules that were
promulgated long ago have clearly become obstacles to good public policy, merely because
the present landscape is entirely different from what existed when the rule was brought into
play. It is far better to lay out more fundamental principles which need to be respected, with
clear guidance as to what is to be achieved. 
• Risk-based approach: The OSFI has developed a sophisticated framework for assessing risk
across different types of institutions, using formalized, consistent methodologies that are as
objective as possible, to assign risk ratings to all institutions. Regulatory resources are
allocated based on risk ratings, as well as the overall impact on the public in case of failure.
This approach ensures that time is not wasted on activities where risk is low, as was often
the case in the days of the Office of the Inspector General of Banks and the Department of
Insurance. 
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• Sound capital requirements: The extent to which assets exceed liabilities is the fundamental
measure of the quantum of loss that can be absorbed without becoming insolvent. In good
times, capital relative to assets or liabilities can be quite small — say, only a few
percentage points — because losses are not expected. Of course, the caveat is that losses
tend never to be expected, but we know that they do occur from time to time. The OSFI has
been successful in holding firm to higher capital levels in good times and bad, and there
seems to be little doubt that these requirements helped Canadian financial institutions to
weather the storm of the recent financial crisis. In fact, the OSFI makes it clear to regulated
institutions that they are expected to maintain working-level capital positions that are at
least 150 per cent of the minimum permissible level.
• Escalating intervention based on risk versus compliance-based approach: The OSFI has, and
international standards require, the power to apply preventive and corrective measures on
an escalating basis as risk increases. For example, suppose the regulator notes that in an
otherwise well-run institution there has been an increasingly significant series of difficulties
in the IT area, leading to control and other related issues. The first step would be for the
regulator to bring the situation to the attention of management and to require a well-
thought-out plan to address the issue. If the plan is not effective or is not followed, the
regulator would follow up, perhaps by meeting directly with the board, and insisting that
steps be taken to get the problem under control. If there continues to be no effective action,
the regulator might consider other possible interventions, such as requiring the institution to
increase its capital base to offset the higher level of risk, or requiring that the institution
bring in new management with respect to the area of concern. The point is that the
regulatory agency is adopting the same approach that would be followed by any competent
management team in addressing a business issue: first there will be a plan to be
implemented and tracked and, if it is not doing the job, more serious measures will be
identified and implemented by management as required. The regulatory agency is merely
requiring management and the board to follow the same path as should be adopted by them
in dealing with any business weakness.
This is to be compared with a compliance-based approach, where the regulator imposes
fines and other penalties for “breaking the rules.” When institutions pay fines, the payments
only reduce the financial resources of the institution. More importantly, fines are paid by
the institution, not by the managers who are making the decisions, so they tend to have a
minimal effect on the decision-making process, which is where the changes need to take
place. And we would say, most important of all, fines and other compliance-based actions
are, by definition, only imposed when the rules have been broken, by which time the
damage may already have been done. Effective regulatory oversight is based on risk
assessment and working with management, backed up with the ability to enforce change
when it is clearly required. Fines and other penalties don’t do the trick. 
• High standards of corporate governance: The quality of governance within an institution is the
foundation for effective management of that institution. The board must establish a clear
framework for the organization’s strategic direction, control framework and risk appetite
across the risk areas that are relevant to the institution’s operations. In this regard, one of
the clear messages from the failures in the early 1980s was that boards of directors had not
focused on the importance of effective systems of corporate governance. Many critical
decisions were made by managers in different functional areas, without board oversight,
resulting in highly inconsistent risk decisions and internal standards for different parts of
the business. Rather than making sure that they were satisfied that the business was being
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operated in an effective fashion, including risk management, internal controls, internal
audit, etc., boards tended to be comprised of friends of the CEO and controlling
shareholders, without much consideration of their responsibilities and the expertise these
directors might bring to the boardroom table. Today, one of the OSFI’s main areas of focus,
including assessing the overall risk level of the institution, is the quality and effectiveness
of the institution’s corporate governance framework. The statutes set out in considerable
detail the responsibilities of board members, including the particular duties of members
serving on the obligatory audit committee and conduct-review committee, both of which
require a majority of independent-director members.
• Strong “duty of care” provisions: Although part of the corporate governance requirements, the
duty-of-care provisions in Canada’s financial institution laws (which are the same as are
applicable to other corporations under the Canada Business Corporations Act), make the
significance of directors’ and officers’ responsibilities very clear. For example, there is a
duty to act in the best interests of the institution, which includes key stakeholders such as
depositors and policyholders. Thus, if a proposition were to come before a bank board
which was clearly favourable to the bank’s shareholders but very unfavourable to the bank’s
depositors, the board members would have to strike a balance that is beneficial to the
institution as a whole. Our view is also that clear, strongly worded duty-of-care provisions
have a highly beneficial impact on the operation of the system as a whole, in terms of
fostering an overall risk-tolerance level that is appropriate for a financial institution.
However, this is a subject for future investigation, as we are presently not aware of any
quantitative studies or other research that would substantiate this “hunch.” 
• Control of related-party transactions: Another important cause of institutional failure was the
ability of financial institutions to enter into transactions with related parties. Financial
institutions have, by their nature, access to large amounts of cash and liquid assets. When
institutions have controlling shareholders that own other businesses, those shareholders can
be tempted to reach into the controlled institution to obtain funding. For example: by
making loans to themselves on extremely favourable terms, by “buying” real estate and
other assets at below market value, by selling assets to the institution for cash and at values
that are higher than market value, and so on. The 1992 legislation introduced a general
prohibition on related-party transactions in both banking and insurance, except for those of
nominal value. Even those, however, are required to be pre-approved by the conduct-review
committee, which must have a majority of independent directors, and also subject to the
criteria that the transaction be on terms that are at least as favourable as market value. (Note
that related-party transactions were more of a regulatory issue for insurance than for
banking because, as previously mentioned, the Bank Act revisions of 1967 prevented any
individual shareholder, or group of related shareholders, from controlling more than 10 per
cent of the shares of a chartered bank.) 
• Disclosure of conflicts of interest: The laws now require directors and officers to fully disclose
to the board any conflict of interest that may arise in connection with their responsibilities
to the financial institution. The director or officer concerned cannot be a party to any
discussions related to the transaction in question. Failure to disclose a conflict of interest
results in the disqualification of the individual from his or her position and renders him or
her ineligible to act as a director of a federal financial institution for five years from the
date of the contravention.
• “Fit and Proper” requirements for all directors, officers, shareholders and key professional advisers
required to be appointed by law: International standards, to which Canada ascribes, require all
key personnel to be fit and proper. This means that there must be nothing in their
backgrounds that would provide reason to believe that they may be inclined not to act in the
best interests of the public. Obviously a prior history of illegal activity or inappropriate role
in an institutional insolvency would be grounds for the regulator to block an individual’s
appointment. Another area that could give rise to a regulatory veto would be a lack of
qualifications in terms of education or experience. The point is that if there are reasons to
believe that, from a public policy perspective, it would be inappropriate for an individual to
be appointed to a key position in a financial institution, then the appointment should be
blocked by the regulator. 
• Existence of Consumer Compensation Plans: Although Canada is certainly not alone in this
regard, the entire regulatory system is underpinned by a series of consumer compensation
schemes that provide assurance to members of the public that, even if their financial
institution becomes insolvent, they will be protected within the limits of the relevant plan.
The Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, for deposit-taking institutions, established in
1967, is of course the most significant of these plans. But there is also, for life insurance,
Assuris, established in 1990, and the Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation
Corporation (PACICC) for general insurance, established in 1987. Each of these plans
provides limited coverage so as to minimize the potential impact of moral hazard — i.e.,
the possibility that the existence of the plans will take away the incentive of consumers to
deal with the most reputable and well-managed enterprises, rather than merely those that
pay the highest rates of interest or have the lowest insurance premiums. As someone with
regulatory experience, the author can also attest to the fact that the presence of these plans
is conducive to early and objective intervention by the regulator. Without such plans,
regulators cannot help but be mindful of the fact that the act of closing an institution’s
doors will plunge large numbers of innocent consumers into a nightmare of financial
disruption — and this knowledge seems inevitable to cause some delay in “pulling the
trigger” on closure, as there is hope (or rather, wishful thinking) that something may
materialize to make this unnecessary. 
The OSFI supervisory framework is described in considerable detail on its website at:
http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/pages/sff.aspx. (Note that, in international
parlance, which is used by the OSFI, “supervision” generally refers to the practices, policies
and procedures utilized by the agency to meet its objectives. On the other hand, “regulation”
generally refers to the legal and statutory requirements applicable to licensees.)  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank conduct the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP), where teams of investigators are sent to specific countries (with
the agreement and co-operation of the country concerned) to painstakingly compare the local
regulatory framework with the applicable international standards. The most recently available
IMF FSAP for the Canadian financial system (January 2014) indicated that “Canada has a very
high level of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
(BCPs). In response to the challenges and structure of its market, the Canadian banking
supervisor (OSFI) has developed, and is a strong proponent of, risk based, proportionate,
supervisory practices and applies a ‘close touch’ approach to its supervised entities. The
supervisory approach is well structured, forward looking and maintained on as dynamic a basis
as possible. Entry to the Canadian market is subject to demanding prudential entry standards.”
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As a generalization, one can say that institutions are required, first at a primary level by the
basic terms of the statutes, but secondly and more profoundly at an operational level by the
OSFI’s policies and guidelines, to adhere to sound business and financial practices in the
transaction of their businesses. In other words, the Canadian requirements for financial
institutions are consistent with what one might include in an MBA textbook intended to guide
management in the operation of a sound institution. We say: “How can any regulatory system
do better than that?” In contrast, we find it impossible to believe that any prescriptive
framework, acting over a diverse group of financial institutions, could ever hope to approach a
situation of optimality in terms of meeting desired regulatory objectives. 
We also suspect that Canadian corporate governance requirements for financial institutions are
more stringent than those applicable to most other jurisdictions and particularly to U.S.
financial institutions. However, to reasonably compare the Canadian and U.S. systems across
this dimension requires knowledge not only of what the laws in each country state, but also
how the courts have interpreted those laws. That is outside the scope of this paper, but we flag
it as a possible area for future research. 
Of course, no system is perfect or incapable of improvement. While systems can be designed
in theory, in the real world, there are usually issues with implementation and administration
that conspire to produce results that are sub-optimal compared to theory. According to the
OSFI’s mission statement and other documents, its role is not to prevent the failure of financial
institutions, which is the responsibility of institution managers and boards of directors, but
rather “to protect depositors and policyholders from undue loss.” In this regard, a possible
emerging issue, based only on speculative comments by some industry members, is that after
receiving international accolades for good performance of the Canadian financial system
during the crisis, the OSFI may now be overly conservative in its application of the
supervisory framework, feeling that it cannot allow its good record to be tarnished by a failure.
If the foregoing point has any credibility, it would be adding to one concern that we have heard
expressed for as long as the OSFI has been applying its guidelines and policies. In the
documents laying out those guidelines and policies, the OSFI always indicates that the agency
“recognizes that regulated institutions may have different practices depending on their size,
ownership structure, nature, scope and complexity of operations, corporate strategy, and risk
profile.” In other words, we have written our policy or guidance to apply to a large chartered
bank, but don’t worry, if you are a small operation we will take account of that when we
interpret the policy for your particular institution. Many of our industry contacts are in the
property/casualty insurance field, where company sizes tend to be a minuscule fraction of the
size of a chartered bank. Many of them suggest that while the OSFI says size and complexity
will be taken into account, the regulatory troops on the ground will want to ensure that they are
not criticized by their superiors who will be reviewing their reports. We suspect that from the
perspective of frontline workers who are inspecting the companies, they believe they will be
more likely to be criticized for missing something in the application of a guideline than to be
complimented for their thoughtful interpretation that fully takes account of the size and
complexity of the regulated entity. Thus, the feedback we get from insurers is that there is a
tendency, despite the caveat about size and complexity, to apply the full weight, or at least
much of the weight of big-institution requirements to small institutions. 
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Most of this paper is about the regulatory framework and how it works to ensure system
stability. At the outset of the paper though, we recognized that a good system must also balance
that particular goal with the overall efficiency of the markets. Too much regulation is definitely
not a good thing. While the system may be very stable it may also have high overhead, leading
to low return on investment, dissuading shareholders; and it may be so constrained as to lack
innovation and product development, penalizing members of the public.
In this regard, we have to say that, in our view, the current regulatory system seems to strike a
reasonable balance with regard to market efficiency. The use of principle-based and outcome-
based approaches leave boards and senior managers free to design operational policies that are
a good fit with their overall core competencies and strategic plans. However, the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, and over the past 12 years — which includes the period of the
financial crisis — Canadian banks have generated pre-tax return on equity (ROE) ranging from
a low of 19 per cent in 2008 to a high of 37 per cent in 2006, with an average of 31 per cent
over the period.64 We think it would be hard to argue that, with these metrics, Canadian banks
are finding themselves saddled with a regulatory regime that is stifling their ability to generate
sufficient profit to be attractive to investors. (But we also acknowledge that a simple statistic
like annual ROE doesn’t necessarily “measure” market efficiency.) 
However, that takes us back to the points made just above. If the system is market efficient for
Canada’s big banks, it does not necessarily mean that the same is true for small institutions
such as property/casualty insurers. Indeed, the property/casualty business has certainly not
enjoyed industry-wide ROEs that are comparable to those of the chartered banks, although
there may be many other reasons why this would be the case. As well, if there is truth to the
“street talk” with regard to an increase in the OSFI’s conservatism since the time of the
financial crisis, for whatever reason, then market efficiency may be declining at the expense of
an over-emphasis on stability. At the end of this paper, we take note of the market-efficiency
question as one for possible future research.
OTHER REGULATORY FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE HELPED CANADA TO PERFORM
WELL DURING THE CRISIS
In the sections above, we have outlined the main characteristics of the Canadian financial
regulatory framework and have expressed the view that the system’s design and operation have
been significant, if not primary, reasons for Canada’s ability to weather the financial storm of
the sub-prime crisis. 
However, it is clear that there have been other factors that have also been to Canada’s benefit
in terms of its recent financial system performance.
64 Standard & Poor’s, A Tale Of Two Countries: U.S. And Canadian Banks' Contrasting Profitability Dynamics, Report,
November 13, 2012.
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One distinguishing feature of the Canadian system is the degree to which governments of the
day have been prepared to work on a collaborative basis, as opposed to an adversarial basis,
with Canadian businesses. For example, when we discussed the establishment of the Canadian
Bankers Association earlier in this paper, we noted that more than 100 years ago, in 1900, the
Canadian government provided the CBA with powers to act as a curator in resolving failed
banks, an activity that in many countries would be reserved for the ministry of finance or a
regulatory agency. This willingness to work with the regulated industries has been a feature of
the Canadian financial system since its earliest days and is a characteristic that is seldom found
in other countries.65 As one study reported, “It is curious and paradoxical that Canada is a
country which has been largely developed around a special blend of private initiative and
public policy. From the earliest days, large projects critical to the economic survival and
growth of the country have tended to be joint ventures between the state and private
entrepreneurs: for example, the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway.
Nor was the close cooperation of business and government only a phenomenon of the first
stages of development. Since that time, it has continued in the form of providing funding,
supportive legislation and actual ownership in such industries as canals and seaways, air
transportation, pipelines, broadcasting, banking and insurance, agriculture, petroleum and
potash to name but a few.”66
We believe that in the financial sector especially, the degree to which industry and
governments in Canada have worked together in the public interest is relatively unique and is
an important contributing factor to Canada’s record of financial stability. The regulation of
insurance intermediation and of investor-protection aspects of the securities industry have, to a
considerable extent, been outsourced to industry-run self-regulatory organizations. The
consumer ombudservices mandated by the federal government for insurance, banking and
securities are run by independent boards (with some industry participation) and are funded by
the respective industries. The insurance policyholder compensation plans for both the life
insurance industry (Assuris) and the property and casualty insurance industry (PACICC) are
additional examples of ways in which governments can outsource activities that, in many
countries, are carried out directly by regulatory agencies or governments. Over the years,
Canadian regulatory agencies have outsourced many important initiatives across the financial
sector to the respective industry trade associations, for example, the Canadian Bankers
Association, the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, the Insurance Bureau of
Canada (the property/casualty insurance trade association) and the Canadian Securities
Association. In the mid-1990s, when it was decided that there should be Standards of Sound
Business Practice for insurance companies, the OSFI suggested an industry working group,
including OSFI observers, to develop the basic standards. The end result was an excellent
document that both industry and regulators could adopt. This same pattern has been
successfully followed by Canadian financial regulators in different sectors of the financial
services industry over the years. 
65 Personal observation by the author, who has carried out regulatory projects in many countries around the world.
66 V. V. Murray and C. J. McMillan, “Business Government Relations in Canada — a Conceptual Map,” Canadian
Public Administration (1983): 592.
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Although we were obviously not privy to communications between senior government officials
and the management of Canada’s large chartered banks during the financial crisis, we are
confident that there were frank and ongoing discussions that could only be helpful to the
overall goal of minimizing the impact of the financial turbulence. In many countries, there is a
strong adversarial relationship between governments and regulated entities, and in those cases,
it would be very difficult to arrange collaborative, constructive conversations in a time of
danger to the system.
Outlined below are some additional regulatory aspects that may have helped Canada’s
economy and its financial institutions weather the recent financial storm:
• A legal difference between Canada and the U.S. in the field of home financing is that, in
most provinces of Canada, if foreclosure on a mortgage is not sufficient to repay the
outstanding amount to the lender, the homeowner is not let off the hook but rather remains
liable for any part of the debt that remains outstanding. By contrast, when their mortgages
are “underwater” — i.e., the amount they owe the lender exceeds the market value of the
property — U.S. borrowers in most states are able to walk away from their mortgages. If
they do not do so, they will end up paying off a loan that is greater than the market value of
their home — a losing proposition from their perspective. This exposes lending institutions
to a risk that does not arise to an appreciable extent in Canada. In retrospect, it seems clear
that the myth that home prices would always rise, and the existence in the U.S. of
government-sponsored incentives for consumers to borrow funds for home purchases, gave
rise to market distortions and the mispricing of risk by banks and other lending institutions.
Similar distortions have not existed, at least to the same extent, in the Canadian
marketplace. 
• A significant difference in the financial-institution landscape also arises from the fact that,
as previously mentioned, the Canadian banking system has been a branch-based system, as
opposed to the system of local banks that emerged in the U.S. Having just a few banks,
which, through their thousands of local branches, represent the major lending institutions in
every corner of Canada, provides a broadly diversified base of business that can provide
each bank with stability in uncertain times. When the fishing business is poor in the
Atlantic provinces and loans there are going into default, the lumber business in British
Columbia may be booming and loan default rates will be very low. There are also
significant economies of scale to be achieved by having a few very large institutions versus
a large number of small to middling institutions. 
• A study carried out for the U.S. Congress (CRS Report for Congress, “Financial Market
Supervision: Canada’s Perspective” — discussed in more detail in discussed in more detail
in the Comparison of the Canadian System with that of the United States section of this
paper found on page 39), emphasizes that the U.S. financial system is much more complex
than the Canadian system. One area where that is likely to have a particular impact is with
regard to the number of institutions that must be regulated. Other things being equal, it
should be less difficult to successfully oversee the operations of five very large banks than
to keep on top of developments with respect to thousands of smaller banks: according to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 2012 annual report, FDIC was at that time insuring
the deposits of 7,181 institutions! So having a relatively small number of institutions to
oversee probably does facilitate the delivery of regulatory activities.
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• Another factor that may be relevant to Canada’s “success” in terms of financial-institution
stability is the way in which ownership rules developed over time. To maintain domestic
control and to prevent commercial ownership of banks, the 1967 Bank Act placed a 10 per
cent ownership limit on bank shares, and this also helped to avoid problems of self-dealing.
(Insurance companies were not subject to this restriction, which is why self-dealing was a
much more common problem in that industry, at least for stock companies. Self-dealing
was not a concern for the large mutuals because, being owned by their policyholders, they
have no shareholders in the traditional sense.) Downstream control situations had, for many
years, also been limited for both banks and insurance companies, so they were not able to
control other businesses as subsidiaries. However, in recognition of competitive and other
business-related considerations, the 1987 Bank Act amendments, along with changes in
Ontario law, lifted the restrictions having to do with banks owning securities dealers, with
the result that all of Canada’s major securities dealers were soon acquired by the chartered
banks. The comprehensive 1992 legislation, described in Table 1, introduced the financial
holding-company concept, which provided a formal regulatory framework for cross-sector
enterprises. In any event, the result has been that in Canada, since 1987, there have been no
major securities dealers that are not owned by chartered banks.67
This may be relevant because being aligned with owners who have a “banking mentality”
may have served to lower the risk profiles of what the investment firms may have become
if they had different ownership. In the United States, where the big brokerage firms and
investment banks were not owned by traditional banks, some grew to be gigantic
enterprises, but of these some were thinly capitalized relative to their liabilities and were
more directly involved in the risk-taking business.
• Each of the five federal agencies with shared responsibility for ensuring the efficiency and
stability of the Canadian financial system — the OSFI, the CDIC, the Bank of Canada, the
Department of Finance and the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada — has a clear
mandate which doesn’t overlap with the mandates of other agencies. As in most areas,
clearly defined, non-overlapping responsibility is an important attribute of successful
operation.
• Although the OSFI is an integrated regulator, the concept of integration is extended to the
maximum degree by the existence of a number of formalized arrangements within the
government. For example, representatives of the OSFI, the CDIC, the Bank of Canada, the
Department of Finance and the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, comprise the
Financial Institution Supervisory Committee (FISC). The FISC’s mandate is “to address the
issues and challenges facing the financial sector, and to refine regulatory requirements that
promote sound practices and procedures to manage risk.”68 The Auditor General of Canada,
in his 2010 review of the OSFI’s operations, found evidence that these committees meet as
required and that their discussions are substantive. He also noted that during the financial
crisis, meetings were held much more frequently than in normal times.69
67 Information in this paragraph largely extracted from: Charles Freedman, “The Canadian Banking System.”
Conference on Developments in the Financial System: National and International Perspectives, The Jerome Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College, April 1997.
68 OSFI web site at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/Pages/default.aspx.
69 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2010 Fall Report to the Parliament of Canada, “Chapter 5: Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions.”
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In the course of researching this paper, we have not found any quantitative analyses that shed
light on the potential validity or importance of the above factors, although several articles in the
popular press have commented on the possibilities.70
The media and others have also suggested additional factors, unrelated to the regulatory
environment, that may have affected the extent to which the Canadian economy was impacted
by the financial crisis, such as: actions by the Bank of Canada, the degree of Canadian banking
linkages with foreign jurisdictions, the general quality of mortgage loan portfolios in Canada
compared to the United States, and so on. Some have even speculated that much of the “good
performance” of Canadian financial institutions can be attributed to a basic inclination of
Canadians to be risk-averse compared to their U.S. counterparts. However, all such hypotheses
are outside the scope of this paper and we leave it to other researchers to quantify their
significance, if any. 
CORRESPONDING REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
As mentioned earlier, the U.K. did not adopt its first bank regulatory regime until 1979. The
basic reason for this state of affairs was that, in the U.K., the historical approach to financial
regulation has been somewhat along the same lines as the approach in most countries to
securities regulation, which is to say that as long as users of the system are well informed and
there is full disclosure with regard to the details of the financial transactions they are entering
into, the state need not interfere. This shifts the focus of regulation away from the realm of
prudential regulation and more to conduct of business regulation. The typical regulatory
approach for securities is exemplified by the website for the Ontario Securities Commission,
which indicates: “it is the general requirement in securities legislation to provide ‘full, true
and plain disclosure’ of all material facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be
distributed.”
Thus, in the case of securities it is the expectation of regulators that prospective investors are
sophisticated and capable of assessing the risks for any particular investment opportunity they
may want to consider, so they will be able to make an informed decision as long as all material
facts have been disclosed. However, the situation with respect to banking, insurance and
dealings with other types of financial institutions, is quite different. The average individual who
is seeking a mortgage to buy a house, or who wishes to obtain an automobile insurance policy,
is not an expert in the workings of the financial markets and will generally not be in a position
to evaluate the risks that the transaction may entail. With these types of common financial
transactions, the power of knowledge all rests with the institution that has prepared the
contract. This fact is formally recognized in the law through the treatment of insurance and
many other financial contracts as “contracts of adhesion”— i.e., a contract is 100 per cent
prepared by one party and the other party can decide to adhere to the contract as presented, or  
70 See, for example: Andrew Coyne, “Our So-called Genius Banks,” Maclean’s (April 2009).
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refuse it. The view from North America has been that merely requiring the institution to
provide the consumer with a bundle of explanatory brochures will not serve to level the
playing field to any appreciable extent. But in any case, in many situations where consumers
are dealing with  financial institutions, one of the most significant risk areas relates to the
financial health of the institution rather than to the details of the transaction, and almost no
individual will have sufficient technical expertise to meaningfully assess the financial health of
a bank or insurance company. Also, most consumers of financial services are generally less
mindful of the consumer-law principle of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer beware,” than is the
case with the purchase of more tangible consumer goods such as automobiles (where the tires
can actually be kicked). 
Another difference between the traditional U.K. model and the North American approach is
that, in the U.K., there are very few restrictions on the business powers of financial institutions.
They can engage in almost any business they wish, but through separate subsidiaries. For
example, a number of grocery stores have incorporated their own banks to provide services to
their customers. “In effect, firms have virtually no regulatory limits imposed on them with
respect to what business they can conduct, but regulation and monitoring with respect to how
business is conducted with consumers is strong, detailed, prescriptive, and extensive.”71
As the U.K. has moved to adopt the rules of the European Union, as expectations regarding
compliance with international standards have become more important, and as the financial
services business has become increasingly complex, the U.K. has gradually adopted an
institutional safety-and-soundness-focused model, closer to what we are used to in North
America. However, there continues to be a strong tradition of marketplace supervision and
consumer protection at the transactional level. 
COMPARISON OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES
The key features of the Canadian financial regulatory system have been described above.
After the financial crisis, the United States Congress was aware of the apparently good
performance of Canadian financial institutions and asked its research group to produce a report
describing the Canadian system and determining whether it could have application for the
U.S.72 Included in the report, dated April 4, 2013, are the following two diagrams illustrating
the structures of the respective systems. 
71 David T. Llewellyn, “Financial Regulation: A Perspective from the United Kingdom,” Journal of Financial Services
Research (2000): 311.
72 James K. Jackson, Financial Market Supervision: Canada’s Perspective, Congressional Research Service, Report for
Congress 7-5700, April 2013.
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THE U.S. SYSTEM
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THE CANADIAN SYSTEM73
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE
The author of the report concludes: “There likely are aspects of Canada’s financial supervisory
framework that may offer an approach to supervising financial markets that may be useful for
the United States to consider. However, the smaller scope of Canada’s financial system and its
economy likely lessen the transferability of systems or procedures used in Canada to the vastly
more complex U.S. financial system.”74
It is clear from the diagrams that the U.S. framework, even in summary form, is far more
complicated than the Canadian framework. As well, the diagram for the U.S. only applies to
banking. Other types of institutions would have different diagrams, possibly even more
complicated than for banking. For example, the insurance business in the U.S. is separately
regulated by each of the 50 states. However, the Canadian diagram covers the entire financial
system except for the securities industry, which is provincially regulated, and except for other
provincially regulated financial companies, which account for only a small part of the overall
financial system. Thus, we can see that, in addition to its relative simplicity, the diagram for
Canada pertains to a much greater percentage of the entire financial system than is the case for
the U.S. diagram. 
73 This diagram, published as part of the U.S. Congress report, shows the minister of finance reporting directly to the
Parliament of Canada. To be more precise, the minister reports to the cabinet, chaired by the prime minister and
consisting of the ministers of the Crown. Government policy decisions are made at the cabinet level and the minister
of finance would be in frequent consultation with the prime minister and, from time to time, the cabinet as a whole.
According to the government of Canada’s website, the Doctrine of Ministerial Responsibility can be stated briefly as
follows: “ministers are broadly accountable to the Prime Minister and the House of Commons [i.e. Parliament], on
behalf of the people, for their exercise of the responsibilities assigned to them when they are appointed, including the
powers and duties provided by Parliament through legislation.” 
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However, we do not agree that because the U.S. financial system is undoubtedly vast and
complex it necessarily requires a complex system for its oversight. In fact, the OSFI, which is
responsible for by far the bulk of regulatory responsibilities within the Canadian framework, is
not a monolithic entity but is comprised of a number of specialist groups, functionally focused
divisions, and so on. When viewed at a level of detail, even the insurance system is somewhat
complex. At a primary level, there are different entities transacting life insurance,
property/casualty insurance and other specialty lines of insurance. However, overlaid on that
primary level of business is the reinsurance business, which sees reinsurance companies
providing specialized reinsurance coverage to insurance companies but not to members of the
public. The different types of insurance businesses, especially life versus property/casualty,
must be staffed by, and regulated by, people having different technical knowledge and
professional training. In fact, the old Department of Insurance was organized by type of entity
supervised, with a life insurance division, a property/casualty division, a trust and loan
division, and so on. But no one would seriously argue that because all of these types of
businesses have different characteristics, they need to be regulated by stand-alone regulatory
agencies. 
Another issue, related to integration of supervision, is that in Canada, consumer affairs,
including matters directly related to the making of contracts (such as insurance), are entirely
within the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. Thus, all of our discussions about the
OSFI are in respect of safety-and-soundness considerations, not direct consumer-related issues.
In the U.S. on the other hand, each state government is responsible for both insurer solvency
and direct consumer protection arising from insurance contract disputes, licensing of agents
and brokers, etc. State governments also have some responsibilities for bank supervision within
their jurisdictions. Some observers have suggested that the U.S. system would be improved if
the states were left to concentrate on consumer protection (as is the case for the provinces in
Canada), with the federal government taking on a much more integrated role in overseeing
insurer solvency.75
We do not suggest that the complexities of the U.S. financial system would somehow become
less complex within an integrated regulatory environment, but instead, that by combining many
of the regulatory responsibilities within one or two agencies, there would be the potential for
substantial improvement in efficiency and effectiveness. This would arise, not from in any way
simplifying the underlying system, but rather from providing the regulatory agency (or
agencies) with a far more comprehensive and cohesive overview of the system at large, with
the potential for achieving more efficient and effective internal communication and analysis of
risk areas.
75 See, for example: David Zaring, “It’s Time to Rethink Insurance Regulation” The New York Times “Dealbook” blog,
January 22, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/it-is-time-to-rethink-insurance-
regulation/?_php=true&_type=blogs&goback=%2Egde_890207_member_5832476394906484736&_r=0#%21.
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Real-life implications of the lack of integration are revealed in the Levin-Coburn report, which
was instigated by the U.S. Senate to investigate the causes of the sub-prime crisis and to make
recommendations for the future. One section of the report describes, as an example, the
situation at Washington Mutual Bank, which was among the eight-largest financial institutions
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Because “WaMu,” as it was
generally known, was technically a savings-and-loan company rather than a bank, it was
subject to direct supervision by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). After an extensive
description of WaMu’s high-risk business philosophy and operations, which in some cases
included fraudulent practices — none of which were ever effectively challenged by the
regulator — as well as documenting OTS’s refusal to co-operate with FDIC reviewers, the
report indicates “OTS officials allowed the bank’s short term profits to excuse its risky
practices and failed to evaluate the bank’s actions in the context of the U.S. financial system as
a whole. Its narrow regulatory focus prevented OTS from analyzing or acknowledging until it
was too late that WaMu’s practices could harm the broader economy”76 (emphasis added). So,
OTS is a perfect example of a non-integrated regulator failing to perceive the big picture, with
disastrous results. 
We should add that, in outlining the benefits Canada has enjoyed as a result of its integrated,
principle-based approach, we do not mean to suggest that simply combining different agencies
under one roof will necessarily give rise to some sort of magical gain in efficiency or
effectiveness. However, over time, with good leadership, cross training of staff, and other
tactics designed to lead to a harmonized organization, the benefits of integrated regulation will
almost certainly become apparent.
There are several other important differences between the two systems, not reflected on the
charts above. One is that, in Canada, every OSFI-supervised institution is subject to a
consistent risk-assessment system. This is not the situation in the United States — a point that
also came up in numerous instances in the Levin-Coburn report. As well, most U.S.-based
regulators have a much more rule-based approach than is the case in Canada, where principle-
based and outcome-based approaches, supplemented with detailed guidance, are the norm. We
are also of the view that Canada’s standards of corporate governance tend to be higher, with a
more stringent duty-of-care provision than exists in most U.S. jurisdictions. However, as we
have already noted, quantifying the relevance of any differences in corporate governance and
duty of care will require more in-depth research.
Another difference between the two systems is the simple matter of Canada’s mandatory
review of banking and insurance legislation every five years. As far back as 1929, Benjamin
Beckhart, in The Banking System of Canada, commented on page 302 regarding the then-
required system of decennial revision: “These frequent revisions have been of real advantage in
preventing the Act from becoming obsolete, in contrast to the policy followed in the United
States, where reform comes not through periodic revisions but through the addition here and
there of patch-like provisions which serve more to confuse and complicate the measure.”
76 United States Senate, Permanent Committee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse, 5.
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We have described how, in Canada during the 1980s, there was a series of financial institution
insolvencies and high-risk situations, which led to a complete reshaping of the financial
regulatory framework. We associate that reshaping and improvements since that time with the
current good performance of the Canadian system. However, in the U.S., there was no such
regulatory epiphany, with the possible exception of the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) of 2002. However, the SOX requirements apply to all publicly listed companies and are
not particularly geared to financial institutions. As well, in keeping with U.S. approaches
generally, they are heavily compliance-based, rather than principle-based, so that an already
complex system became significantly more complex under the SOX rules. 
The AIG Situation
The near-failure of AIG was a critical development in the sub-prime meltdown. It is worth
taking a closer look at how this occurred, in the context of the above discussion about the risks
inherent when there is fragmented regulation of institutions. 
During the most difficult days of the financial crisis, when AIG was known to be on the brink
of failure, there was considerable confusion evident in the media about the regulatory agency
responsible for this insurer, one of the world’s largest. It was well-known within the insurance
industry that AIG’s insurance operations had historically been subject to regulation by the New
York State Insurance Department. However, the identity of the regulator of AIG’s parent
holding company, if said regulator existed at all, was a question mark for knowledgeable
people in both the industry and the financial media. To the surprise of many, it transpired that
the holding company was regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). A system is
extremely fragmented when seasoned industry executives77 do not know the identity of the
regulatory agency responsible for overseeing one of its largest members. 
Why would what was purportedly the world’s largest insurance business be subject to
regulation by the OTS? The answer is that, after the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the
1980s, U.S. law was amended to put the OTS in charge of any holding company having an
S&L association as one of its members. Somewhere within the vast corporate domain of AIG,
there was a small S&L — which, under the law, brought the entire AIG domain within the
remit of the OTS. It is pretty clear, especially in hindsight, that the OTS had little or no
familiarity with insurance and insurance-like risks and therefore was not in a position to
understand the significance of the sophisticated financial instruments being issued by a non-
insuring member of the AIG organization. (The OTS had many other issues as well and, largely
on the recommendation of the U.S. Senate following the Levin-Coburn report — which
recommended “complete OTS dismantling” — the agency has been disbanded and its
responsibilities have been absorbed into other regulatory agencies.) 
As for the credit default swaps being issued by AIG Financial Products (and other issuers) that
were at the root of most of the difficulty, they were like insurance policies but without the
traditional insurance requirement that the purchaser must have an insurable interest in the cover
being offered. In other words, credit default swaps (CDS) were akin to naked bets on whether
particular securities would default or not. 
77 Even some state insurance regulators were unaware that the OTS was the legal supervisor of AIG. This came up at
an international conference in the fall of 2008, attended by the author, when panelists, including some U.S. state
insurance commissioners, were not aware of the OTS role in overseeing AIG.
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The insurable-interest requirement means that the insured will bear an economic loss should
the insured event occur. If individuals could insure against events having no direct bearing on
their own economic situations, they could enter into speculative contracts that would encourage
them to wish for losses to befall others; not considered to be a socially desirable situation.
Even more relevant, however, is the fact that unlimited numbers of individuals might decide to
insure (i.e., “bet”) on a particular outcome in which they have no financial or other interest,
resulting in an aggregation of risks and possible catastrophic loss to the insurer. And that is
exactly what happened to AIG.
One can never know with any certainty “what might have happened if … ”, but with regard to
AIG, it seems probable to us that if there were an integrated approach to financial regulation,
or at least to insurance regulation, the insurance specialists within the regulatory agency would
have been looking into the activities of the U.K. subsidiary that was issuing the credit default
swaps, would have been aware of the tremendous leverage and associated risk that was
involved, would have recognized the dangers in issuing insurance-like products with no
insurable-interest requirement, and would have moved to curb AIG’s activities in this area. 
We feel that as long as there is a such a fragmented system of prudential regulation in the U.S.,
it will be very challenging for the government to establish an effective mechanism for macro-
prudential oversight, without which it will be difficult to avoid future risk bubbles. 
THE SYSTEM-WIDE PERSPECTIVE
To this point, we have said virtually nothing about system-wide considerations. This is because
the evolution of financial regulation in Canada, and other jurisdictions as well, has mostly been
about doing whatever can be done to assure the viability of individual institutions. Prior to
1987 and the creation of the OSFI, the idea was generally that if institutions follow the laws
and regulations that are applicable to them, that is the best we can do. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, there was much talk at the international level of the need to “ring fence”
vulnerable institutions. It now seems naïve to believe that somehow huge financial institutions
could simply be shuttled into a kind of financial isolation ward where they would be nursed
back to good health without implications for the system as a whole. In historical terms, the
realm of system-wide risk and its implications for individual institutions has tended to be
more the concern of the professional economist than of the financial regulator or regulatory
policymaker. 
The sub-prime crisis has illustrated, more dramatically than any previous financial crisis, that
simply complying with a series of basic rules and regulations will be no guarantee of survival.
When the crisis was at its worst, many international financial markets froze up due to a
collapse of confidence within the system as a whole. In such circumstances, institutions could
not afford to take the risk of entering into transactions with other institutions because of
concerns that their counterparties would be unable to honour their side of the transactions. A
number of very large, but thinly capitalized institutions had upcoming transactions that they
had every reason to believe would be low risk. But at the height of the crisis, all bets were off,
and what would be considered to be uneventful transactions in normal times turned out to be
impossible to complete during the crisis. Without the benefit of government bailouts and
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support of the system overall, the failure of those thinly capitalized institutions would have
further damaged confidence, leading to greater paralysis of markets and more widespread
failures, and so the cycle would go on to who-knows-what end. These developments highlight
the fallacy in merely considering the positions of individual financial institutions when
thinking about problems of system stability. 
However, Canadian markets performed much better than described above. We have already
discussed characteristics of the Canadian financial regulatory system that might have
contributed to this result. Since the creation of the OSFI as an integrated regulator, we have
had somewhat of a system-wide perspective here in Canada, because one regulator is now
thinking about risks in different types of institutions. As well, the interactions of the FISC
members no doubt help to bring a more systemic perspective to oversight of the financial
system. The recent inclusion of Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation under the OSFI’s
remit will also help to broaden the OSFI’s breadth of perspective in the housing and mortgage
arena. 
Nevertheless, the fact that there is much to be done on the system-wide front is well illustrated
by the sub-prime crisis. It is incredible to think that even with the OSFI as an integrated
regulator, and the discussions taking place at the FISC group level, the huge risk bubble that
gave rise to the crisis did not get onto the radar screen of the OSFI — or of any other
regulatory agency, anywhere in the world. 
This points out that every jurisdiction will have to do more, both within its own borders and
working with international counterparts, to assess system-wide risks. (It goes without saying
that in this globalized financial world, system risk cannot be thought of as falling only within
specific geographical borders. It will have to be monitored on an international basis.) In the
United States, which was clearly the birthplace of the crisis, the cumulative impact of the wide-
ranging incentives designed to encourage home ownership, and the many unforeseen
consequences of those incentives, turned out to be hugely greater than was anticipated by the
authorities or was recognized by the authorities until after the crisis. If the enormous system-
wide distortion that was building up had been more accurately monitored and identified, it
might have been possible to defuse the sub-prime crisis before it began. Recent steps by
Canada’s minister of finance clearly demonstrate how risk levels in the housing and mortgage-
lending fields can be tempered by judicious adjustment of mortgage-lending rules and other
fine-tuning of system parameters. 
Thinking of Canada’s successful tradition of working closely with the regulated institutions, we
wonder if system-risk awareness could not be significantly improved by having something like
a financial-industry-based parallel to the FISC group, which would include senior-level
representatives of the banking, securities, insurance and pension businesses in Canada and
which would be charged with monitoring system risk in their industries over time. It may be
possible to derive industry-specific ratios and other indicators that could provide a quantitative
dimension to the committee’s discussions. This would be important because the evidence of the
financial crisis is clearly that people in the industry, like the regulators, did not recognize the
extent to which risk was accumulating in the system. (Our impression is that, from an industry
perspective, and particularly in the U.S. market, as long as everyone seemed to be making
money, no one had any incentive to look too closely at what might be happening beneath the
surface.) The industry committee would meet with the government’s FISC on a regular
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periodic basis to provide input to the latter group’s policymaking deliberations. Such a
collaborative effort could prove to be beneficial to both government and industry, and of course
ultimately it would be hoped, to the public. Ideally, such an industry group in Canada could be
paralleled by similar groups in other countries, which could then establish a macro-prudential
risk forum at the international level. (At the present time, our observation — which may be
incorrect — is that within the international standard-setting bodies we mainly have regulators
talking to other regulators, with relatively little input from industry members.)
TOO BIG TO FAIL
The “too big to fail” issue is a difficult one. The regulatory framework we have described is
designed to avoid institutional failure, and fortunately has mostly been quite successful.
However, each of our five major banks is systemically important in the Canadian context;
given the extraordinarily important role that each plays in the Canadian financial system, and
the overall economy, each must be regarded as too big to fail. There have been advantages in
allowing five huge banks to deliver almost all of our banking services — in terms of regulatory
efficacy for example — but at the same time, we have placed ourselves behind the 8-ball in
case there were to be a failure. Not only is there the obviously enormous problem of direct
damage to the financial system in the event of a failure, there is also an underlying problem of
moral hazard — i.e., assuming that each of the major banks is too big to fail, they will be able
to operate in a manner that need not fully take account of risk, aware that if trouble arises they
will be “saved” by the taxpayers. 
Regulatory forbearance, rather than bailout, served the purpose during the Great Depression
(see the An Apparent Paradox section of this report on page 26), but it is questionable whether
similar tactics could work in today’s environment. During the ’30s, it was feasible to keep the
potential import of the situation somewhat wrapped in a hazy world of imprecise statements
and fuzzy documentation. But such would certainly not be possible in the modern, transparent
world. Would Canadians be prepared to accept government assurances that “all will be well in
time”? Or would there be rioting in the streets with demands that the government take
immediate action to “make things right”? Canadians do generally seem to have confidence in
their governments, and don’t seem prone to rioting in the streets. If the minister of finance
and/or the prime minister of whatever party might be in power were to say “we will ride
through these problems,” it is possible that a majority of Canadians might just be inclined to
continue to provide them with political support, partly in recognition of the fact that there may
be no viable alternatives.
However, this presupposes that one or more banks are technically insolvent but still able to
continue to operate, as was the case in the 1930s. In today’s world, that would not likely be the
situation; during the financial crisis, there was evidence that the entire system was freezing up,
which is a different circumstance entirely. So what would the alternatives be in that event? 
One alternative is the one that we saw widely applied in the United States during the crisis,
through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), where huge amounts of taxpayer funds
were used to recapitalize institutions so that they could continue to operate. However, this type
of financing from the public purse always carries the risk that taxpayers will not be paid back
for the amounts they have contributed.
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Another alternative being discussed at the international level is the “bail-in.” This approach
would require large institutions to sell special debt securities that, in the event of financial
difficulty, would be converted to equity, diluting existing shareholders. The “haircut” would be
to the debt holders and to the existing shareholders rather than potentially to the taxpayers. At
first glance, this option seems to have considerable merit, but it is not without problems. As
pointed out by widely respected finance professor, Avinash Persaud,78 as financial difficulty
increases, bail-in securities would become increasingly high risk and could quickly become a
barometer forecasting the onset of serious financial problems. This, in turn, could merely
aggravate an emerging financial crisis, spreading the contagion more quickly than would be the
case without the bail-in option. As Persaud also points out, there is no free lunch. In good times
bail-in bonds would be considered appropriate for long-term investors, such as pension plans,
but if times suddenly turn bad, pensioners would, in effect, “be thrown under the bus” in order
to bail out other bank stakeholders. Although not meeting the bail-in concept in terms of being
legally required for large institutions, some Canadian banks and insurance companies make use
of “Tier 2” capital in the form of subordinated debt, which is provided for in international
standards and which is accepted by the OSFI subject to terms and conditions — one of the
most important being that, in liquidation, such debentures are subordinate to the interests of
depositors and policyholders, as the case may be. Thus, in liquidation, the holders of the Tier 2
subordinated debt would have the same status as common shareholders, somewhat in keeping
with the bail-in concept. 
International standard-setting organizations are calling for higher capital levels for systemically
important financial institutions, with this additional capital serving in a sense as insurance
against failure. Canadian banks are already meeting higher capital standards than their
counterparts in other countries. Basically then, we must hope that the financial regulatory
framework, including higher capital levels, will serve to prevent the failure of any one of our
major institutions. In the meantime, as suggested in the Final Thoughts section of this report
found on page 50, we should at least modernize the Winding-up and Restructuring Act so as to
provide increased flexibility in the resolution of large financial entities. 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICIES
In different jurisdictions, at different times, there has been an emerging realization that the
modern financial network has become sufficiently complex, while its significance to citizens,
businesses and whole economies has become so critically important and globally connected,
that greater international co-ordination and integration of regulatory practices is a necessity.
These emerging concepts found their first supporters in multi-lateral organizations such as the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Although the BIS was founded in 1930 and played a
role in a number of important economic and banking developments in Europe during its early
years, it was only after a number of significant financial institution failures in Europe and in
the United States (in particular, Franklin National Bank, which at one point in time was the
12th largest bank in the U.S.)79 that the BIS began to focus on the implications of international
banking operations and bank solvency in general. 
78 Avinash Persaud, “Bail-ins are no better than fool’s gold,” The Financial Times, December 10, 2013.
79 Joan E. Spero, The Failure of Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International Banking System (New York:
Beardbooks, 1999), 11.
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1974 and, according to the
BIS website, its objective is “to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve
the quality of banking supervision worldwide. It seeks to do so by exchanging information on
national supervisory issues, approaches and techniques, with a view to promoting common
understanding. At times, the committee uses this common understanding to develop guidelines
and supervisory standards in areas where they are considered desirable. In this regard, the
Committee is best known for its international standards on capital adequacy; the Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; and the Concordat on cross-border banking
supervision.” 
Other international organizations have established core regulatory principles for insurance (the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, or IAIS) and securities regulation (the
International Organization of Security Commissions, or IOSCO), while corresponding
standards are now being developed for pensions by the International Organization of Pension
Supervisors (IOPS). 
Another international organization that is having a very substantial impact on financial
institutions, in Canada and other countries, is the International Accounting Standards Board,
which is the authority for prescribing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
There are many good reasons for wanting to standardize financial-reporting requirements
across the globe, but at the same time, finding apparent solutions to some problems seems
often to lead to new ones in other areas, and always with the possibility of unintended
consequences. For example, the “mark to market” rules, among other requirements of IFRS,
give rise to difficult issues for institutions such as life insurers and pension funds, which have
long-term liabilities. 
Some observers have expressed concern about the fact that these international organizations are
asserting a form of extra-jurisdictional power by implying that all member countries must fully
adopt the standards dictated by the international organizations. 
In the financial regulatory area, for example, it is true that the IMF and the World Bank exert
pressure on individual jurisdictions to adopt international standards of regulation: as mentioned
earlier, these two organizations conduct the Financial Sector Assessment Program to determine
the extent to which local regulatory frameworks comply with international standards.
Relatively minor variations from international standards can sometimes result in downgrading
of the “report card” for the particular part of the financial sector concerned. The IMF and
World Bank strongly encourage governments to improve their FSAP report cards, generally by
modifying the laws and regulations so as incorporate the principles of the international
standards and then making sure that the new laws are properly and fully implemented. 
One can quarrel with the implicit assumption in the FSAP process that international standards
are “correct” and that even small deviations therefrom may be considered “incorrect.”
Conditions are different in different countries and it is almost certainly true that one size does
not fit all in the realm of international financial regulation. 
At the same time, we believe it is also true to say that international standards in financial
regulation have played a tremendously beneficial role in assisting jurisdictions in improving
their overall regulatory frameworks. We have personally witnessed the situation in many
jurisdictions where there is no formal legal framework for regulation of financial institutions,
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and no conception of the policies that should be adopted to provide greater financial security to
citizens and public confidence in financial systems as a whole. International standards provide
a concrete framework towards which countries can aspire or that they can build upon. So while
one can question the exercise of quasi-legal powers by these international organizations, and
argue about some details in the international standards, we would say that on balance, their
existence is very beneficial. If anyone has a better way to proceed in terms of raising the
effectiveness of financial regulation in countries around the world, we have not yet seen
evidence of it.
The international standards for banking and insurance are detailed and pervasive, covering the
baseline conditions for effective regulation, the principles that need to be enshrined in the laws,
and the methodologies that should be adopted by agencies in their supervision of the financial
institutions. As well, they are now being augmented with additional material on capital
standards, too-big-to-fail/systemically important institutions and macro-prudential regulation. 
We should specifically comment on the role Canada has played in the development of
international regulatory standards. This country’s directions in modern financial regulation long
pre-date the development of international standards by the various international agencies just
referred to. For example, we can say with certainty that, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the
Department of Insurance was beginning to implement processes that would now be identified
as precursors to “risk-based supervision,” i.e., developing different risk indicators and focusing
regulatory attention on entities where research indicated there was a higher probability of
failure. By the early 1990s, the OSFI was well into its process of developing a regulatory
framework based on risk assessment, guiding principles and high standards of corporate
governance, the latter recognizing that boards of directors and senior managers are ultimately
responsible and accountable for overseeing their institutions’ operations and properly
mitigating the risks they take on. Of course, these measures were less sophisticated than is
currently the case, but the adoption of the new approaches marked the critically important
first steps.
As a designer and early adopter of these new regulatory approaches, the OSFI has played a
lead role in the development of international standards. Senior OSFI officials have frequently
held high-level positions in the international standard-setting organizations for banking and
insurance, and the secretariats of these organizations almost always include OSFI officers who
have been seconded to the international entities.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Thinking about what might be done to improve the Canadian system, and having in mind the
tremendous emphasis on the role of the board of directors, one has to admit that boards of
directors and senior managers are not superhuman. They already have many responsibilities
and more are being added all the time. Perhaps it is time to consider strengthening the board
structure for our largest institutions. Looked at through the lens of history, it seems that board
structures have not changed much over the past 30 or 40 years. However, since 1992, the
responsibilities of boards at financial institutions have exploded. In the Canadian and British
Insurance Companies Act of the 1970s, “corporate governance” essentially dealt with the
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procedures for the calling of shareholder meetings, appointment of the auditor and other
prosaic responsibilities. The whole gamut of important board responsibilities we have
described, were absent. 
One possible change would be for boards to have some permanent, independent directors
working full time on behalf of the entire board. This would not be the same as having a group
of institutional employees assigned to do research on issues raised by the board. Full-time,
independent directors would be bound by the duty-of-care and other directorial responsibilities
and would have to maintain an impartial perspective in addressing the issues of interest. As
with the rest of the board members, their objective would not be to oppose management, but
rather to provide directors with additional assurance with regard to management
recommendations. For example, in modern-day banks it is not unusual for directors on credit
committees to be faced with lengthy submissions from management with regard to proposed
loans and other transactions. At present, although directors will almost always conscientiously
review all the material they are asked to review, in most cases they do not have unlimited time
available. As a double check, we think it would be beneficial to have a more focused review by
full-time directors who would then be able to provide increased confidence that any
contentious issues or other matters for debate, are fully aired with all members of the
committee or the board. 
It might also be helpful for the law to place a specific responsibility on institutional boards (for
institutions over a certain size) to engage independent, external professional advisers when
they are required to consider complex or particularly technical issues. Of course, any institution
is currently free to retain whatever advisers it wishes to employ, and no doubt some institutions
do that. However, our impression, gained over the years, is that boards are sometimes hesitant
to consult with outside advisers, other than with respect to particular transactions, such as
mergers and acquisitions. Generally speaking, we think directors may feel that they are on the
board because of their extensive experience and that therefore they should be able to provide
required input, without running up the additional cost of outside advisers. We think this bias
would be countered if there were a specific legal requirement along the lines that “the board
has a responsibility to seek input from independent professional advisers when there is an issue
for which the majority of the board members believe that such outside advice could be
beneficial to the institution and its clients.” Most board members would probably prefer to err
on the side of caution, and therefore if the situation were such that outside professional advice
might be beneficial, it would be sought. We think this would encourage boards to assess issues
in the most effective and unbiased manner possible. 
Another area that we believe could represent a public-policy improvement, would be to require
not only that every board have a significant proportion of independent directors, but to also
require that those directors have at least a certain minimum level of knowledge about the
business in question, including the fundamental principles and key risk variables with respect
to the financial business concerned, as well an understanding of the legal/regulatory framework
within which the institution must operate. At the present time, although independent directors
will almost always have achieved considerable success in their main field of interest —
otherwise they would not be invited to join the board — their prominence is sometimes in
areas that are not related to the operations of financial institutions. This diverse experience
likely serves the institutions well by bringing new perspectives to the consideration of
important issues facing the institution. However, the other side of the coin is that without
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knowledge or experience regarding financial institution operations, there may be occasions
when they are not in a position to fully participate in board discussions. This could dilute the
benefits that were anticipated by policymakers when mandating the need for boards to include
independent directors.
Some “director training courses” currently exist of course, but there is no consistent
requirement that independent directors partake of such courses, nor are they — to the best of
our knowledge — focused on providing core information about particular industries such as
banking or insurance. (There would probably have to be separate programs for banking and
insurance because the details of the business are different. On the other hand, it wouldn’t hurt
for bank directors to know something about insurance and vice versa.) Based on our experience
in providing these types of training courses to independent directors of insurance companies (in
foreign jurisdictions), we would say that, at most, one week should be sufficient to provide a
rudimentary but practical understanding of the fundamentals of the particular financial business
and its regulation. We might add that the feedback from directors about these programs was
uniformly positive. 
Many independent directors do have extensive, directly relevant experience, in which case
institution-specific training would not be required. It might be satisfactory for the law to make
boards themselves responsible for determining in particular cases, whether they think newly
appointed independent board members should participate in a training program, or not. Except
in cases where the background of the individual obviously makes such training unnecessary,
we expect that, in most cases, the board, and the directors concerned, would decide in favour
of the training. 
In terms of the regulatory regime more generally, we hope that Canada will not become overly
reliant on the use of models for determination of such basic operational parameters as
minimum acceptable capital levels. This is a trend that seems to be gaining favour in a number
of international jurisdictions. Models are undoubtedly useful tools but the data used for input
can never be entirely representative of the real universe of possibilities. We also wonder how
many regulatory agencies, including in Canada, will be able to accurately assess the models to
understand any potential shortcomings. As well, the models say nothing about the potential
surprises that may lurk in the tail-values of distributions. As the financial crisis demonstrated,
those uncharted scenarios can be so extraordinary as to completely dwarf what were considered
to be the more likely possibilities. Many of the razor-thin capital margins that were accepted by
regulators in other countries were accepted on the strength of model predictions that purported
to show capital levels would be sufficient at a 99.5 per cent level of confidence. Models are a
one-way street: no institution will submit a model for regulatory approval that demonstrates
that it requires a higher level of capital, only the opposite. 
One area where we think the Canadian system could be improved is in the area of resolution.
The relevant statute for winding up a bank or insurance company is the Winding-up and
Restructuring Act (WURA). Fortunately, the need for its application has been infrequent, but
the statute is more than 100 years old. Although it has been subject to minor amendments over
the years, it does not contemplate the liquidation of a huge, modern institution such as one of
Canada’s major chartered banks, with their myriad types of financial instruments, off-balance-
sheet items, global interconnectedness and so on. Nor does it provide flexibility with regard to
possible restructuring of debt or other innovative means by which a modern-day liquidator,
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with the approval of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the court, might find to be
desirable in terms of reducing the burden of loss that would otherwise fall too heavily on
depositors or taxpayers. Legislation (with the exception of Canada’s requirement for five-year
reviews of financial legislation) is often only amended after some sort of disaster shows that
amendment is required. But if one of Canada’s large banks ever got into financial difficulty, it
would be too late to consider amending the WURA to facilitate what would need to be done.
The time to act is before there is an urgent need to apply the provisions of the act. 
In thinking about possible future financial crises, we should mention a field of scholarly
research having to do with so-called “normal accidents.”80 The theory of normal accidents holds
that there are some situations where, over time, a catastrophic accident is inevitable. This is
because some processes are so incredibly complex that if they become out of control, which
they inevitably will, then there are an almost infinite number of directions the process can take,
with the possibility of completely unpredictable feedback loops and other random developments,
so that no effective form of intervention will be possible in the short term. The most frequently
cited examples involve out-of-control nuclear reactors, such as we recently saw with the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.
There is plenty of evidence that the international financial system is incredibly complex, and
given the fact that there are no “on/off” buttons or other direct controls on the system, some
have argued that the system constitutes one that is vulnerable to normal accidents. However,
unlike the case with nuclear reactors, the financial system is ultimately controlled by
individuals who, with an appropriate level of international co-ordination, are in a position to
quickly change their operational practices. The great difficulty is that, in the heat of the
moment, there is usually no consensus as to what should be done. Nevertheless, there is the
potential for effective action, which in our view, distinguishes the financial system from the
normal-accident-type situation. This reinforces the view that international agreements and co-
ordinating practices need to be given much greater attention than has been the case in the past,
so that when a global crisis threatens international financial stability, pre-determined game
plans can quickly be put into practice. 
CONCLUSION
The Canadian financial regulatory system has indeed undergone dramatic changes over the
years. During the early period, there was an implicit assumption that the calibre of individuals
involved with the operation of financial institutions was such that detailed requirements and
standards were not really necessary. As well, there was a certain amount of naivete with respect
to what might occur, for example, in the area of related-party transactions. As the world
evolved, it became clear that a much more comprehensive framework was required. That was
ultimately accomplished primarily by two main initiatives: the creation of the OSFI in 1987
and the adoption of the new federal financial institution statutes in 1992. 
80 There are two classic references on this subject. One is Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, by
Yale University professor Charles Perrow, published in 1984. The other is The Limits of Safety: Organizations,
Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, by Stanford University professor Scott D. Sagan, published in 1993.
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The financial crisis has evoked a storm of discussion regarding the potential need for more
regulation, for less regulation, for different types of regulation or a different regulatory focus. It
is no doubt the case that every financial crisis sparks a somewhat similar debate, but the fact
remains that financial crises continue to occur. However, with globalization and the vast
increase in magnitude of the financial sector relative to world GDP,81 financial crises are no
longer of primary interest to bankers, regulators and wealthy members of society. The current
crisis has wreaked havoc on property owners in many countries around the world, on middle-
aged individuals whose life savings have been slashed, on retiring members of defined-
contribution pension plans, and on businesses and many of their former employees. 
Given the present state of the art, it seems to us that if it were to be applied in many
jurisdictions, the OSFI approach would represent the current best bet for avoiding international
financial disasters.
And in fact, this point of view is gaining acceptance with many countries — especially
emerging market countries, which have not previously implemented a cohesive system of
financial regulation — using the Canadian framework as a template, modified as necessary to
take account of local circumstances. The OSFI frequently hosts delegations from regulatory
agencies in other countries who are seeking to observe the Canadian system first hand. The
government of Canada and a number of international sponsors, including the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency, the World Bank and IMF, also support such
development through the Toronto Centre, a non-profit organization established in 1998 in the
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. The Toronto Centre has an objective “to promote
financial stability and access to financial services globally by building the capacity of financial
sector regulators and supervisors, particularly in emerging markets and low income countries to
help improve their agencies’ crisis preparedness and to promote change that will lead to more
sound and inclusive financial systems.” The centre uses the best supervisory methodologies
from Canada and other jurisdictions, but adapted to local capacities, cultures and
circumstances. Because of its evident success, the Canadian approach is also receiving more
attention from international organizations and regulatory agencies in general. Some developed
countries, such as Australia — which also demonstrated good experience during the financial
crisis — already have a system in place that is quite similar to Canada’s, and in fact Canada
and Australia have conferred on the development of a number of regulatory policies.
The Canadian framework is comprehensive, is principle-based, is consistent across the
financial institution playing field, is focused on risk, and is administered on an integrated basis.
It minimizes prescriptive rule-making; benefits from, but does not rely on, internal models that
will never reliably predict what will happen in the tail of the distribution; and does not, by
implication, suggest that regulatory agencies know better what is good for institutions than do
the institutions themselves. The result of all this is to provide Canada with a regulatory
framework that, arguably, is one of the most effective in existence. However, in the aftermath
of the financial crisis there are still many new approaches being debated, some of which may
ultimately further improve the world’s ability to understand and effectively oversee its
financial system. 
81 By 2006, total market capitalization of world stock markets, plus the total value of domestic and international bonds,
equalled 2.4 times the world’s total GDP. Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money (New York: Penguin, 2008), 5.
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